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At age 18, over pinball and pickup basketball games, Abdullahi Yusuf 
was first introduced to ISIS propaganda via YouTube videos.1  ISIS served 
as a solution to the teen’s alienation.2  Yusuf was drawn to the allure of 
 
 1. See Brendan I. Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist Back into a Citizen, WIRED (Jan. 
24, 2017) [hereinafter Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist], 
https://www.wired.com/2017/01/can-you-turn-terrorist-back-into-citizen/ 
[https://perma.cc/QC7A-JFJ6]. 
 2. See id.; see also Joanna Walters, An Incredible Transformation: How Rehab, Not 
Prison, Worked for a US ISIS Convert, GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2018), 
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extremist beliefs, that one organization could solve his problems.3  A few 
months later, he left for the Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport to 
board a flight to Syria.4  Yusuf was attempting to join ISIS.5  Instead, he was 
arrested and charged with providing material support to a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO).6 
But Yusuf was granted an opportunity most other material support 
defendants are not: participation in a rehabilitation program structured by his 
judge, the U.S. Attorney’s office, and a world-renowned expert on 
deradicalization.7  The expert, Daniel Koehler, believes that giving people 
an opportunity to change is core to living in “a democratic, pluralistic 
society.”8  Yusuf’s successful completion of the program meant he would 
not spend the next decade or two behind bars.9 
 “Young people,” defined as those under 25,10 make up the majority of the 
U.S. population charged with the federal crime of providing material support 




 3. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1; Rachel Martin, Radicalization 
Recipe: Why Young People Are Drawn to ISIS, NPR (June 5, 2016, 7:48 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/06/05/480820177/radicalization-recipe-why-young-people-are-dr
awn-to-isis [https://perma.cc/69YF-8NEN]. 
 4. See, e.g., Mukhtar M. Ibrahim, ISIS Trial in Minnesota: What You Need to Know, 
MPR NEWS (May 6, 2016), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/05/06/isis-trial-minnesota-faq 
[https://perma.cc/R5V6-92LJ]; Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1; Martin, 
supra note 3. 
 5. See Ibrahim, supra note 4; Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1. 
 6. See Ibrahim, supra note 4. 
 7. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1; see also Dina Temple-Raston, 
He Was Caught Trying to Join ISIS, Now He’s in Jihadi Rehab, NPR (May 16, 2016, 4:55 
PM) [hereinafter Temple-Raston, He Was Caught], 
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/05/16/478257287/he-was-caught-trying-to-join-
isis-now-hes-in-jihadi-rehab [https://perma.cc/93QZ-6TE6] (explaining the principles and 
strategies that Koehler uses to run the German Institute on Radicalization and 
De-Radicalization Studies). 
 8. See Martin, supra note 3. 
 9. See Walters, supra note 2. 
 10. See infra Section II.B. 
 11. See CTR. ON NAT’L. SEC. AT FORDHAM L., THE AMERICAN EXCEPTION: TERRORISM 
PROSECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES — THE ISIS CASES 3, 11–12, 28 (2017) [hereinafter 
AMERICAN EXCEPTION], 
https://news.law.fordham.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/TheAmericanException9-17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N5LW-Z9NX]. “Eighty percent . . . were indicted on material support 
charges.” CTR. ON NAT’L. SEC. AT FORDHAM L., CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS IN THE 
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would-be terrorists, including those in the early stages of indoctrination12 — 
the material support statutes are deliberately broad to facilitate arrests before 
any violence occurs.13  Material support conduct includes actions such as 
donating funds, communicating online, and intending to move abroad to join 
an FTO.14  Although most material support offenders can receive up to a 
statutory maximum sentence of 20 years, most receive a lesser sentence.15 
When a defendant is offered and has completed a tailored alternative to 
incarceration program, judges are generally more likely to opt for a sentence 
below the maximum.16  Such a program may also help the public feel safer 
once a material support defendant returns home.  The only such diversion 
program specifically created for young persons charged with material 
support was in Minneapolis, Minnesota, through the District of Minnesota.17  
In 2016, the Minneapolis program aimed to rehabilitate a young person 
charged with material support to ISIS.18  Yusuf, who was 18 at the time of 
his arrest, pursued a path of re-pluralization as opposed to a possible 
double-digit long prison sentence.19  “Re-pluralization,” a term coined by 
German radicalization expert Daniel Koehler,20 is “the careful reintroduction 
of problems and solutions into a radicalized person’s life, so that they can 
[choose to] no longer devote all their mental energy to stewing over 
[extremist thinking].”21  “Through positive and supportive personal 
 
[https://perma.cc/WT5W-GKT2]. For information on FTOs, see infra note 28 and 
accompanying text. 
 12. See Sameer Ahmed, Is History Repeating Itself? Sentencing Young American Muslims 
in the War on Terror, 126 YALE L.J. 1520, 1539–40 (2017). 
 13. See id. at 1540. 
 14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B. 
 15. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 13; Quick Facts: Offenses Involving 
National Defense, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (2017), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/National_
Defense_FY17.pdf [https://perma.cc/939W-CGEG]. In 2017, the average sentence for 
providing material support to an FTO was 157 months. See id. 
 16. See Roberto Cordeiro & Arthur Penny, Alternatives to Incarceration in New York 
Eastern and Southern Districts, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., MALCOLM WIENER CTR. FOR SOC. 
POL’Y (May 10, 2016), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/wiener/programs/criminaljustice/research-publications/
young-adult-justice/developments-in-young-adult-justice/alternatives-to-incarceration-in-ne
w-york-eastern-and-southern-districts [https://perma.cc/B8KN-82UH]. For further 
information about various alternative to incarceration programs, see infra Section I.E. 
 17. See Kelly A. Berkell, Off-Ramp Opportunities in Material Support Cases, 8 HARV. J. 
NAT’L SEC. 1, 47–48 (2017). 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1. 
 20. See id.; Temple-Raston, He Was Caught, supra note 7 (explaining how Koehler runs 
the German Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies). 
 21. Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1. For more information on 
re-pluralization, see infra Section IV.B.i. 
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relationships, mentoring, capacity building, [and] education,” Yusuf chose 
to understand that no one organization can solve his problems.22  
Re-pluralization education teaches that decisions need not be binary, that 
much of life is made out of the gray, not the stark black and white.  That 
teenager is now 23 years old and leading a successful life in Minneapolis.23  
No matter where on the radicalization spectrum the defendant is, it is best 
for the broader community if the defendant has an opportunity to 
deradicalize. 
Although Yusuf is the first and, so far, the only graduate of the 2016 
Minneapolis program,24 the program’s monumental goals warrant 
emulation.  The Minneapolis program’s success should serve as inspiration 
for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, where nearly 20% of all 
ISIS-related cases are prosecuted.25  This means that two of the nation’s 94 
federal district courts hear nearly one out of every five ISIS-connected 
cases.26  Thus, the Southern District of New York (SDNY) and the Eastern 
District of New York (EDNY), separated by a ten-minute subway ride, 
should consider implementing their own material support diversion program 
— either pre-trial or post-sentencing. 
This Note argues that a tailored diversion program for young people 
charged with material support will combat excessively harsh sentences and 
do more to prevent terror than incapacitation prevents.27  The enactment of 
 
 22. Daniel Koehler, Violent Radicalization Revisited: A Practice-Oriented Model, INT’L 
RELS. & SEC. NETWORK (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/192640/ISN_191575_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ9N-7XSX]. 
 23. See Hollie McKay, How Minneapolis’ Somali Community Became the Terrorist 
Recruitment Capital of the US, FOX NEWS (Feb. 16, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/us/how-rep-ilhan-omars-minnesota-district-became-the-terrorist-r
ecruitment-capital-of-the-us-officials-highly-concerned [https://perma.cc/XGV2-GUM2] 
(explaining how “Yusuf’s ‘transformation’ has been nothing short of ‘successful’ and one that 
could be adapted to others going down a dangerous road to radicalization”). 
 24. See Berkell, supra note 17, at 47. 
 25. See ISIS in America: The Cases, PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, GEO. WASH. [hereinafter 
ISIS in America], https://extremism.gwu.edu/cases [https://perma.cc/HXT7-LS2D] (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2020). Of the 209 ISIS-connected cases in the United States, 37 cases are in 
EDNY and SDNY. Therefore, 17.70% of ISIS-connected cases are prosecuted in EDNY or 
SDNY. This is the number for all ISIS-connected cases, not for solely material support cases. 
The Author reviewed all 209 cases to note which were prosecuted in EDNY and SDNY. 
AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 3, 12, 28. Eighty percent were indicted on material 
support charges. CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS, supra note 11, at 2. 
 26. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 3, 12, 28; Court Role & Structure, U.S. 
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure 
[https://perma.cc/859P-TSBW] (last visited Oct. 21, 2020). 
 27. Incapacitation refers to incarceration; people who are incarcerated are incapacitated 
from society. “Incapacitation reduces crime by literally preventing someone from committing 
crime [outside of prison,] through direct control during the incarceration experience . . . .” 
Shawn D. Bushway, Incapacitation, 4 REFORMING CRIM. JUST. 37, 37 (2017). 
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a diversion program for young material support defendants in SDNY and 
EDNY would be a first step towards rehabilitating individuals and 
preventing further radicalization.  Part I explains the material support statutes 
and how the terrorism enhancement applies under federal sentencing 
guidelines.  Part I also describes the number and types of prosecutions for 
terrorism-related charges, the various costs of long-term imprisonment, and 
the status of current diversion programs in the federal system and in SDNY 
and EDNY.  Part II questions what is in the nation’s best interest: long terms 
of incarceration rooted in specific deterrence or rehabilitation for vulnerable 
young people who might further radicalize in prison?  Part II also explains 
how the attenuated material support statutes, coupled with the terrorism 
enhancement, impact young defendants and considers why young people 
should be sentenced differently than adults.  Part III examines the outcomes 
of the District of Minnesota’s terrorism diversion program and of other 
countries’ terrorism diversion programs.  Part III also explains some of the 
pitfalls of diversion programs in general and the specific concerns of relevant 
stakeholders most interested in seeing the program succeed.  Part IV 
contends that for EDNY and SDNY to successfully rehabilitate people 
convicted of material support, it is most effective to provide these defendants 
with a structured program focused on re-pluralization, which includes 
family, community, choice, and the ability to make mistakes. 
I. WHO ARE MATERIAL SUPPORT DEFENDANTS AND HOW ARE THEY 
SENTENCED? 
A. The Material Support Crime 
Material support is typically prosecuted under two federal criminal 
statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2339A for providing material support to terrorists and 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B for providing material support or resources to designated 
FTOs.28 
 
 28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B; see also Berkell, supra note 17, at 21 (explaining how “[t]wo 
related but less frequently employed statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339C and 2339D, prohibit 
fundraising for terrorism and receiving military-type training from a designated FTO, 
respectively. Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2339 criminalizes the act of harboring or concealing a 
terrorist”) (citations omitted). Furthermore, an FTO is designated by the Secretary of State if 
she has determined that: 
(A) the organization is a foreign organization; 
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 
1182(a)(3)(B) of this title) or terrorism (as defined in section 2656f(d)(2) of Title 
22), or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; 
and 
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The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was the impetus for the first 
material support statute.29  It was amended in 1996 after the Oklahoma City 
bombings.30  The September 11, 2001, World Trade Center attacks led to 
further amendments through the Patriot Act.31  In the statutes’ first six years, 
from 1994 to 2000, there were only six material support cases.32  By contrast, 
92 material support cases were brought in the three years following 
September 11.33  After September 11, material support became the Justice 
Department’s most frequent anti-terror charge.34  Convictions under the 
material support statutes “require no proof that the defendant engaged in 
terrorism, aided or abetted terrorism, or conspired to commit terrorism.”35  
Therefore, “what makes the law attractive to prosecutors — its sweeping 
ambit — is precisely what makes it so dangerous to civil liberties.”36 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A defines “material support” as: 
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency 
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, 
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation 
. . . .37 
Material support violation sentences range from time served to the 20-years 
maximum.38 
 
(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of 
United States nationals or the national security of the United States. 
8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
 29. See Nicole Hong, ‘Material Support’ Statute Is Front and Center in Antiterror Push, 
WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/material-support-statute-is-front-and-center-in-antiterror-push-
1432719002 [https://perma.cc/N9U5-GD82]. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See DAVID D. COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 165 (2006). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). 
 38. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 28. “Violations of Section 2339A are 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years; violations of Section 2339B by 
imprisonment for not more than 20 years.” CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41333, 
TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: AN OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. § 2339A AND § 2339B (2016). 
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A wide range of conduct constitutes material support.  Everything from 
raising $300 for Al Shabab39 to boarding a plane with the intent to find and 
join ISIS abroad to helping prepare an attack on U.S. soil with those who 
will execute it.40  The statutes were written with the intent of broad use, and 
the government has prosecuted individuals under this extensive scope.  
Professor Sameer Ahmed explains: “As part of the War on Terror, the 
government adopted a strategy of proactively preventing terrorist attacks 
before they take place and incapacitating any individual who supports 
terrorist organizations.”41  In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the then-
Attorney General John Ashcroft instructed the Department of Justice to 
“prevent first, prosecute second.”42  In 2006, then-Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales held a press conference where he explained, “homegrown terrorists 
may prove to be as dangerous as groups like Al Qaeda.  Our philosophy here 
is that we try to identify plots in the earliest stages possible, because we don’t 
know what we don’t know about a terrorism plot.”43  Thus, the material 
support statutes’ utility is in their breadth, without which the government 
would not have as much power to cast the widest net possible. 
 
 39. See CTR. ON L. & SEC., N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 – SEPTEMBER 11, 2011, at 7, 20 (2011) [hereinafter TERRORIST TRIAL 
REPORT CARD], 
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/TTRC-Ten-Year-Issue.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8MRU-8MR8]. “Al-Shabab, or ‘the Youth,’ is an Islamist insurgent group 
based in Somalia.” Al-Shabab has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization since 
2008. “Al-Shabab’s leadership declared allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012.” Al-Shabab, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab 
[https://perma.cc/54AL-E7VZ] (last visited July 17, 2020). 
 40. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 28. For example, “Jaelyn Young was 
sentenced to 12 years in prison for attempting to depart the U.S. and join ISIS in Syria. 
Although [Young] envisioned a nonviolent role for herself, she understood that ISIS was a . . 
. terrorist organization when she attempted to board a flight to leave the United States with 
the express goal of providing her services to ISIS.” Divergently, a jury convicted Abdul Malik 
Abdul Kareem “for violating the material support statute when he helped Elton Simpson and 
Nadir Soofi prepare for their attack in Garland, Texas, on behalf of ISIS.” Id. He was 
sentenced to 30 years in prison. See Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem Update: US Judge Calls for 




[https://perma.cc/3CQU-NZWU]. Kareem is currently appealing his case and may be 
awarded a new trial. See id. 
 41. Ahmed, supra note 12, at 1525. 
 42. Id. (quoting Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. 9 (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States)). 
 43. Eric Umansky, Department of Pre-Crime, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 29, 2008), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/02/department-pre-crime/ 
[https://perma.cc/3PH4-PBJA]. 
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B. The Sentencing Guidelines and the Terrorism Enhancement 
Nearly all terrorism suspects are tried in Article III courts.44  Article III 
judges have broad discretion in sentencing.45  This is especially true after the 
2005 Booker v. United States decision, in which the Supreme Court granted 
district courts broad discretion to impose sentences in an effort to create a 
sentencing scheme that complies with the Sixth Amendment.46  Judges must 
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including “the history 
and characteristics of the defendant,” “the kinds of sentences available,” and 
“the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct.”47  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines determine the guidelines 
 
 44. See George D. Brown, Punishing Terrorists: Congress, the Sentencing Commission, 
the Guidelines, and the Courts, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 517 (2014). 
 45. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of 
Sentencing, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 46. See Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (holding that the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and allowing the Court to exercise its discretion in 
sentencing). 
 47. A court must impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, after 
considering the following factors: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and 
to provide just punishment for the offense; 
 (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
 (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of 
defendant as set forth in the guidelines— . . . 
(5) any pertinent policy statement 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 
28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy 
statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet 
to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued 
under section 994(p) of title 2); and 
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the 
defendant is sentenced. 
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range for a person charged with a federal crime.48  Unless there is a 
mandatory minimum or maximum, an Article III judge can choose to 
sentence the defendant within, above, or below the guidelines.49  Judges must 
consider the guidelines set out in a table, which has two parts: (1) the offense 
level and (2) prior criminal history category.50  The seriousness of the alleged 
conduct, as well as other factors, determines the offense level.51  Once the 
judge determines the offense level and criminal history category, the judge 
will look at the chart and find the applicable sentencing range, which is given 
in months.52 
Certain felonies are grouped into sentencing enhancements, which add 
time to a defendant’s base guidelines range.53  Material support sentences are 
capped at 240 months (or life imprisonment, if the death of any person 
results).54  But if a material support defendant is charged with an additional 
 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “A district court may not presume that a Guidelines sentence is 
reasonable; it must instead conduct its own independent review of the sentencing factors, 
aided by the arguments of the prosecution and defense.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 
180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). The district court may depart from the Guidelines range 
when it “consider[s] all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the 
sentence requested by a party.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). 
 48. See generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) 
[hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
 49. See id. at ch. 5. 
 50. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
 51. See Federal Sentencing, FED. DEFS. N.Y., 
https://federaldefendersny.org/information-for-client-and-families/federal-sentencing.html 
[https://perma.cc/r6n6-72z4] (last visited June 9, 2020) (explaining how, “[f]or example, 
murder is at the top of the chart, at level 43. Theft of a small amount of money is closer to the 
bottom of the chart, at level 6”). “For example, the offense level will usually decrease with 
‘acceptance of responsibility,’ which is most often demonstrated by pleading guilty. The 
criminal history category is calculated by giving ‘points’ to each prior conviction.” Id.; see 
also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, at ch. 4, pt. A.  
A more serious prior conviction will receive more points. A less serious [one] will 
receive fewer points, or no points at all. Older convictions will not be counted if 
they happened more than fifteen years ago for the more serious convictions, or ten 
years ago for the less serious convictions. 
Federal Sentencing, supra note 51. 
 52. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, at ch. 5, pt. A. 
 53. See id. at ch. 3. Examples of other types of enhancements include hate crime 
motivation, serious human rights offense, and using a minor to commit a crime. See id. 
 54. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B. Violating §§ 2339A or 2339B subjects someone to a 
maximum prison term of 15 or 20 years for each count respectively. See also AMERICAN 
EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 28. 
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crime, the terrorism enhancement often leads to a sentence above 20 years; 
this enhancement is a major contributor to material support sentences above 
20 years.55  The terrorism enhancement requirement is satisfied if the offense 
is felonious conduct that (1) involved a crime of terrorism, or (2) was 
intended to promote a crime of terrorism.56  The terrorism enhancement only 
refers to a “federal crime of terrorism” — it does not provide a specific list 
of criminal offenses.57  The federal crime of terrorism “statute lists over fifty 
crimes and requires that a qualifying offense be ‘calculated to influence or 
affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate 
against government conduct.’”58 
Section 3A1.4 of the Guidelines inflates a defendant’s criminal history to 
a category VI, the harshest possible category, even when that defendant has 
no prior criminal record.59  Section 3A1.4 has a dramatic impact on sentences 
by increasing both factors in the sentencing calculus: a defendant’s offense 
level and criminal history score.60  This means the criminal history score can 
be completely artificial if a defendant has not committed any prior crimes. 
Unsurprisingly, apart from Section 3A1.4, the other Guidelines provisions 
that automatically raise a defendant’s criminal history beyond the properly 
calculated criminal history score involve defendants with aggravated prior 
criminal convictions.61  The Guidelines authorize a judge to sentence a 
defendant lower than the recommended Guidelines when “reliable 
information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category 
 
 55. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 3A1.4 (stating acts of 
international or domestic felony terrorism are eligible for a terrorism enhancement); Ahmed, 
supra note 12, at 1528 (explaining “[o]f all the adjustments in the Guidelines, the Terrorism 
Enhancement is the most severe. As an example, the Enhancement can lead to a sentence from 
thirty years to life for a crime that would otherwise result in a sentence of around five years”). 
 56. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 3A1.4. One of the enumerated 
statutes is providing material support to a terrorist organization under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A 
and 2339B. See id. (application note 2). 
 57. See Brown, supra note 44, at 533. 
 58. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)). 
 59. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 3A1.4(b). 
 60. See James P. McLoughlin Jr., Deconstructing United States Sentencing Guidelines 
Section 3A1.4: Sentencing Failure in Cases of Financial Support for Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, 28 LAW & INEQ. 51, 53 (2010). 
 61. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 4B1.1(b) (automatic assignment 
to criminal history category VI for career offenders who have prior convictions for drug 
trafficking or crimes of violence); id. § 4B1.4(c)(2)–(3) (automatic assignment to criminal 
history category IV or VI for defendant sentenced under Armed Career Criminal Act due to 
prior conviction for violent felony or serious drug offense); id. § 4B1.5(a)(2) (automatic 
assignment to criminal history category V for certain sex crime defendants with prior sex 
offense convictions involving minors). 
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substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal 
history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.”62 
For example, in United States v. Ceasar,63 Amera Ceasar was charged 
with material support to ISIS for serving as an online ISIS facilitator through 
Facebook and other social media platforms.64  She was also charged with 
obstruction of justice after re-connecting with ISIS members online while 
released on bond.65  Although her material support charge was capped at a 
20-year sentence, the government chose to advocate for a 30- to 50-year 
sentence based on her obstruction of justice charge and the terrorism 
enhancement’s boost.66  Since the terrorism enhancement increases a 
defendant’s criminal history to a category VI,67 and she received multiple 
additions to her offense level, it was within the Sentencing Guidelines for 
Ceasar, who had no criminal history, to receive up to 50 years in prison.68 
In another case where the defendant was convicted of both material 
support and obstruction of justice, Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi 
explained how the two charges, when intersected with the terrorism 
enhancement, create a warped effect: 
It is ironical — more than ironical, potentially dangerous — that the 
government was able to take what is already a very serious crime — 
attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization — 
and, on the basis of some not overly strong facts, bring an obstruction 
charge that more than doubled the maximum sentence otherwise 
available. . . .  And the additional term of 20 years of imprisonment seems 
incongruous.  Obstruction of justice can, of course, in some circumstances, 
be a very serious crime.  But we have to look at the context.  And here, in 
this specific context, the record does not establish the seriousness of that 
crime.  Indeed, it looks as though the court imposed the sentence it did 
based on the heinousness of Defendant’s attempted terrorism and simply 
used the obstruction conviction as a means to go beyond the statutory 
maximum of that terrorism count.69 
 
 62. Id. § 4A1.3(b)(1). 
 63. 388 F. Supp. 3d 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 64. See id. at 200. 
 65. See id. at 203. 
 66. See id. at 223. 
 67. See McLoughlin Jr., supra note 60, at 54. 
 68. See Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. at 218, 223. 
 69. United States v. Pugh, 937 F.3d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 2019) (Calabresi, J., concurring). It 
is worth noting that on December 10, 2019, the Second Circuit, in Pugh II, held that there was 
an additional procedural error because of the district court’s inadequate statement of reasons 
and remanded for resentencing. See United States v. Pugh (Pugh II), 945 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2019). 
The Second Circuit emphasized that “the district court must impose a sentence that is 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to fulfill the purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 28. And 
“if the court determines that a lower sentence will be just as effective as a higher sentence, it 
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The distorted effect illustrates how the terrorism enhancement can more 
than double a defendant’s sentence when a second, non-maximum sentence 
charge is added — even though Congress intended a 20-year maximum 
sentence for non-violent material support offenders.70  This means a 
defendant can receive a life sentence for a crime with a 20-year maximum.  
This warped, sentence-lengthening impact is an example of how the 
terrorism enhancement is used to aggrandize a sentence without considering 
further individualized factors, such as criminal history or specific deterrence. 
C. Numbers and Types of Terrorism-Connected Prosecutions 
Between September 11, 2001, and February 2018, federal courts 
convicted over “660 individuals on terrorism-related charges.”71  These 
convictions include both domestic acts of terror as well as criminal conduct 
tied to international terrorism.72  Since the first ISIS arrests in March 2014, 
37 out of 209 ISIS-connected charges were prosecuted in the Southern and 
Eastern Districts of New York.73  Ten were prosecuted in SDNY, and 27 
were prosecuted in EDNY.74  This is nearly 18% of all ISIS charges in the 
United States.75  In fact, “since the September 11th attacks, E.D.N.Y . . . . 
has become an aggressive prosecutor of terrorism, securing more convictions 
than any other U.S. Attorney’s office.”76  Cases charged in EDNY and 
 
must choose the lower sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). Judge Calabresi issued a similar 
opinion in his concurrence, warning of the extreme use of obstruction of justice charges. See 
id. at 28–30 (Calebresis, J., concurring); see also Darrell Fields, Wednesday, December 11th 




 70. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 1, 2. 
 71. Myth v. Fact: Trying Terror Suspects in Federal Courts, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Feb. 14, 
2018), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/myth-v-fact-trying-terror-suspects-federal-courts 
[https://perma.cc/862C-HTHT] (comparing convictions in federal civilian courts to those in 
military commissions which “have convicted only eight [terrorism-related cases], three of 
which have been overturned completely and one partially”). 
 72. See id. (elaborating on how “[f]ederal court convictions include those resulting from 
investigations of terrorist acts and of criminal acts by those with an identified link to 
international terrorism. Federal courts have convicted many high-profile terrorists, including 
‘Shoe Bomber’ Richard Reid [in 2002], Ramzi Yousef (1993 World Trade Center bombing), 
Faisal Shahzad (Times Square bomber [in 2010]), and Sulaiman Abu Ghaith (Osama bin 
Laden’s son-in-law . . . in March 2014[)]”). 
 73. See ISIS in America, supra note 25. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. William Finnegan, Taking Down Terrorists in Court, NEW YORKER (May 8, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/15/taking-down-terrorists-in-court 
[https://perma.cc/D3L3-XUMU]. 
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SDNY “feature a diverse mix of [prosecutions], including foreign fighters, 
facilitators, domestic plotters, assailants, and hybrid cases combining foreign 
and domestic objectives.”77 
Material support has become the most frequently charged terrorism 
offense since September 11, 2001.78  According to New York University’s 
Center on Law and Security’s analysis of jihadist-inspired terrorism cases, 
the government alleged material support in 11.6% of cases in 2007; that 
measure rose to 69.4% by 2010.79  There were 65 charges of § 2339B 
material support — over four times any other terrorism charge.80  The 
second-most common charge was § 2339A material support with 14 
charges,81 and the third was 18 U.S.C. § 1001 charges of false statements 
with 11 charges.82 
Approximately 77% of individuals charged in ISIS-related cases are U.S. 
citizens,83 and nearly all defendants in ISIS-connected cases identify as 
Muslim.84  “By contrast, 58% of all federal criminal defendants are U.S. 
citizens.”85  Notably, 72% of defendants had no criminal history at all, and 
89% of cases involved social media86 — it is therefore not surprising that 
most people charged with ISIS-related cases are young.87  In fact, 20 was 
“the most prevalent age” and a majority of defendants were aged 25 years or 
younger. 88 
 
 77. AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 10. 
 78. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUM. RTS. FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 32 (2008), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ZJL-6AU5]. 
 79. TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 39, at 19. 
 80. See CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS, supra note 11, at 13. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. at 3. 
 84. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 3. 
 85. Id. 
 86. CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS, supra note 11, at 26, 27. 
 87. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 11 (“While the average age for all 
ISIS-related cases is 27.2, the most prevalent age is much lower, at 20. The median age is 
25.5 years old. In the aggregate, the ISIS cases skew heavily toward the earlier stages of 
adulthood, with more than half the cases involving individuals who are 25 or younger at the 
time of arrest. Nevertheless, 47% of the individuals are older than 25, and the most destructive 
domestic attacks were perpetrated by assailants near 30 years of age. Only a third of 
individuals in ISIS cases in the United States are 30 years of age or older.”); Social Media 
Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/RNB3-9TW3]. Ninety percent of people aged 18 to 29 use social media. Id. 
 88. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 11. 
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D. Monetary Costs of Imprisonment 
The United States incarcerates more people than any other country in the 
world,89 spending “more than $80 billion each year to keep roughly 2.3 
million people behind bars.”90  The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 
currently incarcerates 184,000 individuals, and in Fiscal Year 2019, their 
budget exceeded $7 billion.91  In 2018, the average cost of a person detained 
in federal prison was $36,299.25 ($99.45 per day).92  If a person is sent to 
solitary confinement, that annual rate can more than double to $75,000 per 
year.93 
Furthermore, the United States spends over $100 billion on 
counterterrorism each year.94  This $100 billion is spent on military 
expenditures, investigations, local police force trainings, prosecutions, and 
diplomatic efforts.95  The funding for anti-terrorism and prison is 
astronomical; diversion programs cost a fraction of either the counter-terror 
or BOP budgets and could appropriately come from either, or both, funding 
streams. 
E. The Current State of Diversion Programs in the Federal Court 
System Generally, and in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New 
York Specifically 
Diversion programs, alternative to incarceration programs, and off-ramp 
solutions generally refer to the same concept: providing a 
rehabilitation-focused program for people charged or convicted with a 
 
 89. See World Prison Populations, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm 
[https://perma.cc/GJ26-ZV9P] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020) (explaining how “[p]rison rates in 
the U.S. are the world’s highest, at 724 . . . per 100,000” people). 
 90. See Nicole Lewis & Beatrix Lockwood, The Hidden Cost of Incarceration, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/17/the-hidden-cost-of-incarceration 
[https://perma.cc/7BTV-HJE3]. 
 91. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2019 PERFORMANCE BUDGET 
CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION SALARIES AND EXPENSES 1 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1034421/download [https://perma.cc/7AWS-J7CR]. 




 93. See id. 
 94. See Jeanne Sahadi, The Cost of Fighting Terrorism, CNN (Nov. 16, 2015, 6:29 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2015/11/16/news/economy/cost-of-fighting-terrorism/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/YJP3-D2X3]. 
 95. See id. 
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criminal offense.96  Diversion programs aim to improve public safety and 
curtail recidivism “by targeting the underlying problems that led to the 
criminal act.”97  Generally, these programs, for both state and federal courts, 
aim to divert people to community–based solutions with the ultimate goals 
of reducing crime, limiting jail time, and eliminating the many collateral 
consequences of involvement with the criminal legal system.98  Diversion 
programs can be mandated in lieu of prison time, or in addition to prison time 
with the sentence possibly shortened due to participation in the program.99  
They can occur pre-trial or as part of someone’s sentence.100  Prosecutors’ 
offices typically operate diversion programs.101 
However, the probation office and the judiciary run diversion programs in 
SDNY and EDNY.  Grassroots organizations help operate some federal 
alternative to incarceration programs; these programs “developed . . . 
independently of both the Sentencing Commission and the Judicial 
Conference policy.”102  Furthermore, the federal alternative to incarceration 
programs require intensive supervision, pre-trial services involvement, and 
the time of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.103  The ultimate 
financial question is whether these programs warrant the monetary cost given 
the savings attributable to reduced recidivism and improved lives.  Probation 
officers, as well as at least one think tank, say these programs are 
cost-efficient.104 
 
 96. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Rethinking Federal Diversion: The Rise of 
Specialized Criminal Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 47, 49 (2017). 
 97. Micah W. Kubic & Taylor Pendergrass, Diversion Programs Are Cheaper and More 




 98. See Diversion, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/areas-of-focus/diversion [https://perma.cc/3WLS-Z3EU] 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2020). 
 99. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 96, at 109. 
 100. See id. at 53–54, 61. 
 101. See id. at 56. 
 102. Kevin T. Wolff et al., A Viable Alternative? Alternatives to Incarceration Across 
Seven Federal Districts, U.S. CTS., PRETRIAL SERVS. 8 (Apr. 15, 2019), 
http://www.kevintwolff.net/uploads/2/0/1/8/20187445/000_uspt_ati_execsum_041519.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TBQ8-7DS2]. 
 103. See id. at 9. 
 104. See id. at 7–8, 9–10 (“An analysis of drug court cost-effectiveness conducted by the 
Urban Institute found that drug courts provided $2.21 in benefits to the criminal justice system 
for every $1 invested. When expanding the program to all at-risk arrestees, the average return 
on investment increased even more, resulting in a benefit of $3.36 for every $1 spent.”); see 
also Kubic & Pendergrass, supra note 97. 
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Typical considerations for program entry include factors such as offense 
conduct, history of substance use, mental health circumstances, and criminal 
history.105  Professor Christine S. Scott-Hayward clarifies that “although the 
benefit of a reduced sentence is significant, it is qualitatively different from 
a dismissal of all charges, particularly for defendants with no prior criminal 
history.”106 
EDNY offers two diversion programs: the Pretrial Opportunity Program 
(POP) and the Special Options Services Program (SOS).107  POP is an 
alternative-to-incarceration, drug court program in the pre-sentence phase of 
a defendant’s case.108  Programs offered pre-trial and pre-sentencing are 
particularly motivating for participants because they can potentially avoid or 
lessen jail time; sometimes participants can even “avoid a conviction 
altogether.”109  The probation office and judiciary run these programs. 
SOS is available to those “between the ages of 18 and 25 who are charged 
with non-violent crimes and who may benefit from the structure and 
direction of intensive supervision.”110  EDNY Judge Jack B. Weinstein 
started SOS because he “believed that instead of pretrial detention, many 
youthful offenders might benefit more from intensive supervision and access 
to education, job training, and counseling.”111  However, SOS is not 
 
 105. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 96, at 56. 
 106. Id. at 58–59. 
Criminal convictions carry severe direct consequences, including loss of liberty or 
restrictions on liberty, as well as an increasing number of fees and fines. There are 
also indirect consequences that diminish an individual’s rights and privileges. These 
include denial of public housing and assistance benefits, restrictions on 
employment, difficulty obtaining employment, restrictions on access to student 
financial aid, and civic exclusion, including ineligibility for jury service and felon 
disenfranchisement. The immigration consequences, particularly deportation, of a 
criminal conviction are also significant. Further, these consequences can also 
impact an individual’s ability to successfully complete their sentence of probation 
or to successfully reenter society after release from prison. 
Id. at 58 (footnotes omitted). 
 107. See Cordeiro & Penny, supra note 16. Cordeiro and Penny are Chief Pre-trial Services 
Officers for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. U.S. PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY, E. DIST. OF N.Y., ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION 
IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK: THE PRETRIAL OPPORTUNITIES PROGRAM AND THE 
SPECIAL OPTIONS SERVICES PROGRAM 8 (2015), 
https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/local_rules/ATI.EDNY_.SecondReport.Aug2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GG52-DF4D]. 
 110. Id. at 11–12. 
 111. Id. at 11. 
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available for anyone charged with a terrorism-related offense, even those 
deemed non-violent. 
Furthermore, EDNY also offers a post-sentence drug court known as 
Supervision to Aid Re-entry (STAR).112  STAR participants can begin the 
program as an alternative to incarceration at sentencing or as a condition of 
supervised release after their time of incarceration or assignment of 
probation.113  Though some believe diversion programs are cost-inefficient, 
these programs are cost-saving because they reduce the amount of time a 
defendant is incarcerated, the amount of time on supervised release and, of 
course, recidivism rates.114 
Since 2015, SDNY has run the Young Adult Opportunity Program 
(YAOP).115  Like SOS, the YAOP helps young people charged with crimes 
gain access to counseling, job services, and substance use treatment.116  The 
Program is intended to benefit non-violent, young adults (between 18 and 25 
years old), but also considers adults over 25 years old on a case-by-case 
basis.117  Successful YAOP participants can receive a reduction or deferral 
of their charges, a shortened sentence, or even the dismissal of their charges; 
the majority of program graduates have avoided a sentence of further 
incarceration.118 
A report on alternatives to incarceration programs, compiled by federal 
pre-trial services officers across the United States, revealed that in seven 
federal districts, including EDNY and SDNY, these programs had successful 
short-term impacts.119  The programs studied included SDNY’s YAOP and 
EDNY’s POP and SOS.120  The results are encouraging — participants 
remained employed, abstained from illegal substance use, and were less 
likely to be re-arrested.121  Rearrests were “significantly less likely” for 
program participants. 122  Strikingly, nearly half of program graduates’ cases 
were dismissed.123  Additionally, “successful completers 
are . . . significantly less likely to receive a prison term than their matched 
 
 112. See id. at 48. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. at 7–8. 
 115. See Cordeiro & Penny, supra note 16, at 2–3. 
 116. See id. at 3. 
 117. See Young Adult Opportunity Program, U.S. DIST. CT. S. DIST. N.Y. (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/programs/young-adult-opportunity-program 
[https://perma.cc/Q9AW-7ZSP]. 
 118. See Cordeiro & Penny, supra note 16, at 3. 
 119. See Wolff et al., supra note 102, at 3, 7. 
 120. See id. at 5–6. 
 121. See id. at 11. 
 122. Id. at 6. 
 123. See id. at 7. 
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counterparts” (23% compared to 81%), and “received an average prison 
sentence of 4.97 months[;] . . . their matched counterparts were sentenced to 
an average of 42 months (ranging from one day to 20 years).”124 
The report concluded it is cost-effective to avoid or minimize custody at 
the pre-trial and post-conviction stages.125  The federal pre-trial services 
officers declared: “[T]he human implications cannot be overstated.”126  
Experts know successful reentry is extremely difficult because, after long 
stints of incarceration, many people find themselves alienated from healthy 
support systems; these support systems are vital for the newly-released 
individual to live a law-abiding life.127  Ultimately, diversion programs do 
more than just help individual defendants — diversion programs also unite 
families, create safer communities, and lessen incarceration rates.128  
However, material support defendants are not permitted to participate in any 
of SDNY’s or EDNY’s programs, thus leaving a worrisome gap for a 
vulnerable group of young adults.129 
II. INCAPACITATE OR REHABILITATE: WHAT IS IN THE NATION’S BEST 
INTEREST? 
Part II questions what is in the nation’s best interest: long terms of 
incarceration rooted in specific deterrence, or rehabilitation for vulnerable, 
young people who might only be further radicalized in prison?  Section II.A 
questions what keeps U.S. residents the safest: double-digit sentences with 
no rehabilitation and the possibility of further radicalization or options for 
rehabilitation and reintegration?  Section II.B examines how young people, 
defined as those under age 25, are different from adults and reviews a case 
study of a young material support defendant to whom an EDNY judge gave 
a significantly reduced sentence. 
A. What Best Ensures the Nation’s Safety? 
As stated in Part I, the material support statutes are intentionally broad to 
catch non-violent defendants before they may act violently or assist those 
who act violently.  The offense conduct, the level of radicalization, and 
incarceration’s impact are significant factors when considering public safety.  
 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 11. 
 126. Id. at 10. 
 127. See id. at 11. 
 128. See id. at 10. 
 129. See Transcript of Bail Application at 33, United States v. Augustine, No. 
18-CR-00393 (E.D.N.Y Oct. 24, 2019) (explaining there is no alternative to incarceration 
program available for those charged with material support). 
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This Section explores what keeps us safest: retributive justice focused on 
specific deterrence in the form of long-term incapacitation or rehabilitation 
and transformative justice focused on giving young people the opportunity 
to change? 
i. Differing Theories on Deterrence and Incapacitation 
The material support statutes’ architects focused on severe prison time as 
a deterrent.130  The threat of legal punishment’s impact is general deterrence 
on the public at large; it is meant to encourage other possible law-breakers 
to not act criminally.131  The theory of general deterrence suggests that 
“imposing a penalty on one person will demonstrate to others the costs of 
committing a crime, thus discouraging criminal behavior” by others.132  
Specific deterrence “is the extent to which a sentence will ‘persuade [the] 
defendant to resist further criminal behavior.’”133  Those focused on 
rehabilitation and reintegration view the risk of release as necessary for the 
critical possibility that the individual is provided a better life134 and, in the 
case of material support defendants, is not further radicalized in prison.135 
Although the crime of material support is itself non-violent, it is viewed 
more harshly than other non-violent crimes given its connection to terrorism 
— one of society’s most feared forms of violence.136  This fear of terrorism 
is illustrated in the continued elongating of material support’s statutory 
maximum.  The sentencing maximum for material support has only been 
extended, never reduced — from ten years to 15, to now 20.137  Some judges 
believe closer to the maximum of 15 or 20 years is necessary for general and 
specific deterrence in material support cases.  For example, in 2010, 
Sabirhan Hasanoff, a U.S. citizen, was charged in SDNY with conspiracy to 
 
 130. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 2; Ahmed, supra note 12, at 1565 (“[J]ust as with 
offenders in the War on Drugs, the government’s focus when convicting young American 
Muslims in the War on Terror has not been to promote their rehabilitation, but instead to 
incapacitate them with lengthy punitive sentences.”). 
 131. See Kelli D. Tomlinson, An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?, 
80 FED. PROB. 33, 33 (2016). 
 132. Brian Jacobs, The Role of Publicity in Sentencing, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2017, 4:44 PM) 
(quoting U.S. District Judge Jack B. Weinstein), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2017/10/23/the-role-of-publicity-in-sentencing/#e76fb
03e5c6b [https://perma.cc/YC52-FXWA]. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Berkell, supra note 17, at 6–7, 45–46. 
 135. See infra Section II.A.ii. 
 136. See Hannah Ritchie et al., Terrorism: Public Opinion on Terrorism, OUR WORLD IN 
DATA (Nov. 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#public-opinion-on-terrorism 
[https://perma.cc/T4WV-BDAN]. 
 137. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 2. 
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provide material support in the form of money.138  In September 2013, Judge 
Kimba Wood sentenced Hasanoff to 18 years in prison.139  Hasanoff’s 
attorney “argued that there are two different kinds of terrorists: those who 
renounce what they have done and those who are just diehard and are going 
to be this way to the end.”140  In response, Judge Wood stated: 
I am puzzled by one facet of this, which is if I were to conclude that Mr. 
Hasanoff has essentially turned over a new leaf, if he still believes his 
afterlife will be enhanced if he commits jihad, how can I believe that he can 
be individually deterred?141 
Judge Wood believed the public’s safest option was to incarcerate 
Hasanoff for almost the entire 20-year maximum.  The judge’s sentence was 
rooted in her disbelief that the defendant had, could, or would change his 
beliefs.142  Others, including former Assistant U.S. Attorney Johanna Baltes, 
believe 15 years is not long enough for many material support defendants 
because they, like Baltes, “have not seen a defendant show[] remorse about 
what it is they’ve been charged with doing.”143  Former Eastern District of 
Virginia Judge Gerald Bruce Lee described: “These are not the typical cases.  
You are not going to have anybody with a prior criminal record generally.  
You are not going to have somebody come in and say, ‘Well, I renounce my 
prior beliefs, and now I am prepared to go forward.’”144  These experts view 
rehabilitation as impossible because they assume the defendant is not 
interested.  But not all experts agree.  For example, Director of the Center on 
National Security at Fordham Law School, Professor Karen Greenberg, 
“think[s] maybe we should consider that there are different levels of 
involvement in terrorism.”145  Professor Greenberg goes on to explain that 
the material support statutes’ scope reduces the need for judges to make 
individualized “distinctions and comparisons that would otherwise be made 
in criminal sentencing contexts.”146 
 
 138. See Joanna Baltes et al., Convicted Terrorists: Sentencing Considerations and Their 
Policy Implications, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 347, 358 (2015). 
 139. See id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. However, Judge Wood recently had a change of heart about Hasanoff. On 
October 27, 2020 she granted him compassionate release. See Opinion & Order at 12, United 
States v. Hasanoff, No. 10-CR-162 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 27, 2020). Judge Wood released Hasanoff 
59 months early, in part so he could help care for his loved ones during the COVID-19 
pandemic. See id. at 5–8, 11. Judge Wood stated clearly: “Hasanoff is not a danger to any 
person or the community.” Id. at 12. 
 143. Baltes et al., supra note 138, at 366. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 369. 
 146. Id. 
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Furthermore, most material support defendants’ “actions d[o] not lead to 
any identifiable harm or imminent risk of harm.”147  Judges would normally 
take this lack of harm into consideration during sentencing “pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s instruction to consider ‘the seriousness of the 
offense’ as well as Section 2X1.1(b)(1)–(2) of the Guidelines, which 
provides for an offense-level reduction for uncompleted crimes.”148  Because 
the terrorism enhancement applies to many material support defendants, the 
lack of harm from the offense conduct is often not even considered.149  Under 
the Terrorism Enhancement, individuals convicted because of government 
sting operations are treated the same as those convicted for actions where the 
government had no role in setting them up.150  Terrorism sentencing fails to 
consider that when an informant is involved, “a defendant’s intent, 
knowledge, and capability of committing the crime is usually much 
lower.”151 
Not only does the enhancement cause a lack of individualized sentencing, 
but also the role of undercover government operatives leads to an inability 
to know the defendant’s level of radicalization.  As defense attorney Joshua 
Dratel stated, “it will always be unclear just what the defendant would have 
done — or not done — absent the solicitation, encouragement, and assistance 
of government operatives,’ and the defendant ‘might not have presented a 
danger except in conjunction with a confidential informant.”152  The 
unknown of a defendant’s actions is important when considering the terms 
of the individual’s sentence.  Were they committed to an FTO or exploring 
a new ideology?  Why were they drawn to the FTO originally?  
Understanding the defendant’s personal story and reasons for interest in an 
FTO is important in determining a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).153  
This is especially true given that each defendant is entitled to an 
individualized sentence.154 
 
 147. Ahmed, supra note 12, at 1530. 
 148. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1531 (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Joshua L. Dratel, The Literal 
Third Way in Approaching “Material Support for Terrorism”: Whatever Happened to 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B(c) and the Civil Injunctive Option?, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 11, 61 (2011)). 
 153. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, at 458–60. 
 154. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005). 
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ii. The Realities of Radicalization in Prison and the 20-Year Maximum 
Sentence 
Most defendants are released before the 20-year maximum for a material 
support charge.155  And the vast majority of material support defendants are 
U.S. citizens.156  Unless convicted of another crime, the U.S.-citizen 
defendant will be released to live in the United States.  Thus, the remaining 
question is, what will happen to these individuals when they are released?  
This question is important for all defendants, of course.  Society is best 
served when defendants leave prison ready to work, to contribute to their 
communities, and to serve as supportive family members.  But this question 
is especially important when it comes to possibly radicalized individuals, no 
matter where they are on the radicalization spectrum (not at all radicalized, 
merely curious, more radicalized than not, or fully radicalized). 
The material support prohibition’s breadth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 
2339B means there are people prosecuted who may not be as much of a true 
believer of ISIS or another FTO, or as fully radicalized, as the label 
“terrorist” connotates.  In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme 
Court held “[t]he material-support statute is, on its face, a preventive 
measure — it criminalizes not terrorist attacks themselves, but aid that makes 
the attacks more likely to occur.”157  The preventive nature of the law 
combined with the 20-year maximum means there will be people, such as 
the person prosecuted for giving $300 to al-Shabab,158 who may not be fully 
radicalized but imprisoned.  No matter where on the radicalization spectrum, 
this Note purports it is best for the broader community if the defendant has 
an opportunity to deradicalize.159 
In fact, radicalization happens in prison.160  An unintended consequence 
of prison sentences could be either further radicalization or the beginning of 
 
 155. See CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS, supra note 11, at 21. 
 156. See id. at 3. 
 157. Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 35 (2010). 
 158. See TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 39, at 20. 
 159. See generally Lorenzo Vidino & Seamus Hughes, America’s Terrorism Problem 
Doesn’t End with Prison — It Might Just Begin There, LAWFARE (June 17, 2018, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/americas-terrorism-problem-doesnt-end-prison—
it-might-just-begin-there [https://perma.cc/FL4Q-ARKX] (stating that “Elaine Duke, 
then-acting secretary at the Department of Homeland Security, . . . acknowledged before 
Congress that ‘we need to work with the Department of Justice and its Bureau of Prisons . . . 
to make sure [convicted terrorists] do not return to violence once released’”). 
 160. See id. See generally GREG HANNAH ET AL., RAND CORP., RADICALIZATION OR 
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radicalization for someone who was never radicalized to begin with.161  As 
socio-legal scholar Richard Abel explains, there are many terrorism 
defendants who, “[s]eeking a sense of meaning through identification with a 
larger group and cause, . . . were easily manipulated.”162  If someone was 
never radicalized to begin with, incarceration will certainly not prevent 
further radicalization.  Instead, incarceration may serve as the very impetus 
for radicalization.163  A study by the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence shows that of the ISIS supporters 
interviewed, over one in four164 stated they were not radicalized before 
prison — that they became radicalized for the very first time in prison.165 
Young people charged or convicted of material support are particularly 
susceptible to radicalization tactics in prison because, for most, it is their first 
time behind bars.166  Extremist incarcerated recruiters understand that 
 
 161. See Vidino & Hughes, supra note 159 (explaining that various countries learned that 
incarcerating people convicted of terrorism does not solve the problem because “[i]n jail, 
terrorists network and proselytize, making the problem worse”). It is concerning “that the 
United States has not developed a comprehensive system to rehabilitate individuals convicted 
for terrorism while they are incarcerated.” Id. 
 162. RICHARD L. ABEL, LAW’S TRIALS: THE PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
US “WAR ON TERROR” 72 (2018). 
 163. See UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON THE MANAGEMENT OF 
VIOLENT EXTREMIST PRISONERS AND THE PREVENTION OF RADICALIZATION TO VIOLENCE IN 
PRISONS 109 (2016) (“[P]rison radicalization to violence is an issue of considerable 
importance and recruitment attempts, successful or otherwise, do occur.”). 
 164. Of 79 people interviewed, at least 27% said they were first radicalized in prison. Oscar 




 165. See Florence Gaub & Julia Lisiecka, The Crime-Terrorism Nexus, EUR. UNION INST. 
FOR SEC. STUD. (EUISS) 2 (2017), 
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_10_Terrorism_and_crime.pd
f [https://perma.cc/N87T-P7DG] (“[P]rison can act as an incubator for jihadists since it 
facilitates the creation of networks between petty criminals and jihadist ideologues, as well as 
the formation of likeminded cells. The poor conditions in some prisons, as well as the 
prospects of a difficult restart following release can foster an environment conducive to 
networking. The Charlie Hebdo attacker Cherif Kouachi met Amedy Coulibaly in Europe’s 
largest prison, Fleury-Mérogis, both were mentored there by Djamel Baghdal, an al-Qaeda 
recruiter.” After they were released from prison, they continued to meet and were involved in 
the jailbreak of another extremist person. Coulibaly stated that “prison is the best fucking 
school of crime. In the same walk, you can meet Corsicans, Basques, Muslims, robbers, 
small-time drug dealers, big traffickers, murderers . . . you learn from years of experience”). 
 166. See CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS, supra note 11, at 26. Additionally, the 
radicalization process does not happen linearly. See FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
AT N.Y.U., RETHINKING RADICALIZATION 10–11 (2011), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/98G2-FJPR] (“Empirical research on radicalization conclusively shows that 
the path to terrorism is far from linear. While studies have identified various factors that may 
influence the process, including personal circumstances, perceptions of injustice (both local 
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someone’s first time in prison is usually “a period characterized by feeling 
lonely and frightened.”167  Those who are incarcerated often lose their sense 
of self and completely lose their autonomy.168  These recruiters also 
“understand that . . . their ability to recruit young, first-time offenders into 
their” extremist group, and “feed them back . . . to a network outside the 
prison” allows recruiters to persuade these first-time offenders “to carry out 
terror acts on behalf of the group.”169  A report by the RAND Corporation 
further describes the process of radicalization in prison and why it is so 
common, stating that a “cognitive opening” to radicalization is formed 
because incarcerated individuals are more “susceptibl[e] to new and 
radicalizing ideas or beliefs.”170  There are striking similarities between what 
 
and international), exposure to ideology that promotes violence as ‘jihad,’ and social bonds, 
it simply does not support the notion of a clear path from personal or political discontent to 
violence.”). 
 167. Anne Speckhard & Ardian Shajkovci, Prison — Militant Jihadist Recruiting Grounds 
or Refuge for Rehabilitation?, INT’L CTR. FOR STUDY VIOLENT EXTREMISM (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.icsve.org/prison-militant-jihadist-recruiting-grounds-or-refuge-for-rehabilitatio
n/ [https://perma.cc/YS7S-HX83]. Loneliness occurs because, while incarcerated, people tend 
to be cut off from family and friends. 
Separation from the regular day-to-day support that may be supplied by such 
relationships causes psychological stress at a time when the new prisoner is facing 
a traumatic set of conditions and going through a difficult adjustment. Social 
support and supportive relationships are known to be important for individuals’ 
physical and emotional health and supportive relationships have been shown to 
protect individuals against offending in the future. 
HANNAH ET AL., supra note 160, at 6 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 168. HANNAH ET AL., supra note 160, at 6 (explaining that an incarcerated person’s 
understanding of self is threatened because they are “deprived of personal or sentimental 
possessions.” For example, people “may use clothing and other personal items as symbols 
and reminders of their personal affiliations and ties to groups and identities” — removing 
“such items is part of the process of stripping away prisoners’ autonomy and selfhood”). 
Furthermore, the prison environment completely removes an individual’s “control of their 
daily routine, and replaces it with an array of imposed rules and regulations and bureaucratic 
controls.” Also, “the imposition of harsh and arbitrary discipline and the removal of the 
prisoners’ ability to make decisions for themselves poses a significant threat to their 
self-image and sense of self-efficacy, as it effectively reduces them to the status of helpless 
children.” Id. at 7. 
 169. See Speckhard & Shajkovci, supra note 167. 
 170. HANNAH ET AL., supra note 160, at 50. 
A number of young European Muslims perceive themselves to be rejected by 
Western society. Under such circumstances people tend to seek to re-establish or 
confirm their sense of personal and group identity. The prison context may sharpen 
or exacerbate such experiences of rejection and prejudice, and increase the urgent 
need to find way of coping with or overcoming these threats to self-identity. 
Id. at 15 (citation omitted). 
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are believed to be the forces leading to the radicalization of young people 
and the psychological impact of imprisonment upon individuals; specifically 
undergoing a crisis of the self, which challenges or even destroys one’s 
self-conception, experiencing acute feelings of rejection by one’s native or 
adopted society and seeking to cope by adopting a new sense of 
self-identify or a new belief, which may be delivered in adopting a new 
belief structure (religious or otherwise) and being assimilated into a new 
inclusive (and frequently protective) group identity.171 
Given the psychological and physical dangers presented by prison, 
incarcerating young people can compound their vulnerabilities into 
radicalization.172 
Furthermore, because most material support defendants will return home, 
continued or further radicalization in prison should be viewed as a broader 
public safety issue.  The National Counterterrorism Center released a report 
stating that in 2016 there were 300 currently incarcerated people convicted 
of terrorism-related crimes, 90 of whom are due to be released before 
2022.173  Jessica Stern, a professor at Boston University specializing in 
extremism and the author of Isis: The State of Terror, explained: “At least 
some will probably reengage in terrorist activity . . . because they either 
remain radicalized or are susceptible to re-radicalization.”174  Thus, 
supervised release is particularly important for material support defendants. 
iii. The Role of Supervised Release 
When someone is released from federal prison or jail, they are often 
placed on supervised release.175  Supervised release is another way in which 
the court can give an individualized sentence and remedy to a defendant.  
Standard conditions of federal supervised release include reporting to a 
probation officer (PO), notifying a PO when leaving specific geographical 
areas, lawful employment, and notification of a change in residence.176  
Special conditions of supervision can include place restrictions, intermittent 
confinement, polygraph tests, computer and internet restrictions, and 
 
 171. Id. at 50. 
 172. See id. at x. 
 173. See Walters, supra note 2. 
 174. Id. (alteration in original). 
 175. See Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/overview-probation-supervised-release-conditions 
[https://perma.cc/2GMU-9G7M] (last visited Oct. 22, 2020); Supervised Release, FED. DEFS. 
N.Y., 
https://federaldefendersny.org/information-for-client-and-families/supervised-release.html 
[https://perma.cc/VN33-T8V8] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020). 
 176. See Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions, supra note 175. 
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community service.177  Judges use supervised release as a mechanism for 
reintegrating the defendant back into society and protecting the public; 
judges can also choose creative supervised release tactics.178 
Although supervised release may seem, on its face, not punitive, 
significant liberty is stripped away from individuals.  Unlike parole, 
supervised release is an “additional penalty.”179  If a defendant is on 
supervised release for over ten years, which many material support 
defendants are,180 that is a decade of drug screening, weekly calls to a PO, 
and limited internet access, as well as limitations on where a defendant can 
go, work, and visit.  This results in criminalizing non-criminal actions.  There 
are many collateral consequences of technical supervised release violations, 
including curfews that make it harder to find employment, limitations on 
often-needed licenses and other registrations, and failed drug tests — any of 
which can land the person back in federal custody.181  Supervised release can 
include near-constant surveillance with “no clear process to register 
grievances or appeal decisions.”182 
 
 177. See id. 
 178. See United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that 
supervised release conditions are designed to protect the public and rehabilitate the 
defendant). 
 179. See Jacob Schuman, Supervised Release Is Not Parole, 53 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 587, 623 
(2020). In the United States, there are 4.5 million people serving terms of criminal 
supervision, which includes probation, parole, and supervised release. 
This “mass supervision” of convicted defendants is, as the District Attorney of 
Philadelphia Larry Krasner recently said, “a major driver of mass incarceration.” 
Currently, almost 300,000 people are incarcerated for violating conditions of their 
supervision — one third of all prisoners in thirteen states, and more than half of all 
prisoners in Arkansas, Idaho, Missouri, and Wisconsin. 
Id. at 589. 
 180. See generally ISIS in America, supra note 25. For example, Yusuf was sentenced to 
20 years of supervised release. See Twin Cities Man Who Tried to Join ISIS Is Released from 
Halfway House, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 21, 2017, 6:44 PM), 
https://www.twincities.com/2017/11/09/twin-cities-man-who-tried-to-join-isis-is-released-fr
om-halfway-house/ [https://perma.cc/6SYL-SENY]. 
 181. See Schuman, supra note 179, at 626. Schuman goes on to explain how “‘[w]hat was 
originally designed to assist re-integration into the community,’ instead is ‘facilitating 
reincarceration.’” Id. at 629 (footnote omitted). 
 182. Topeka K. Sam, It’s Time to Overhaul America’s Broken Probation and Parole 
Systems, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS. (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/it-s-time-overhaul-america-s-broken-probati
on-and-parole-systems [https://perma.cc/PX56-2PX8]. Sam has personally experienced 
living under supervised release conditions. See id. In 2019, “the Supreme Court took a small 
step against mass supervision by striking down one provision of the supervised release statute 
as violating the defendant’s right to a jury trial” in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 
(2019). Schuman, supra note 179, at 589–90 (footnotes omitted). 
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The intensity of supervised release should be reassessed given there has 
been very little recidivism of those convicted of crimes of terror since 
September 11.  The Terrorism Recidivism Study (TRS): Examining 
Recidivism Rates for Post-9/11 Offenders illustrates that recidivism for 
terrorism-related offenders is extremely low.183  In total, nine out of 561 
offenders recidivated while incarcerated or upon release.184  “Of the 247 
offenders . . . released during the course of the study, four recidivated” by 
committing new crimes or violating supervised release terms.185  None of 
these new crimes were connected to terrorism.186  For example, one person 
was re-incarcerated for two years for “committ[ing] fraud by illegally buying 
food stamps.”187  This indicates a recidivism rate of approximately 1.6% 
among released political extremists.188  In comparison, the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics reported “that within the first year, 44% of the sample of [state 
prisoners] had been rearrested and, within three years, 68% had been 
re-arrested.”189  These findings suggest that the heavy “surveillance of 
released political extremists . . . are unwarranted.”190 
 
 183. See Omi Hodwitz, The Terrorism Recidivism Study (TRS): Examining Recidivism 
Rates for Post-9/11 Offenders, 13 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 54, 54 (2019). The study examines 
recidivism rates of offenders convicted in the United States of terrorism-related offenses 
post-9/11.  
 184. Id. at 60. The study guaranteed that each of the cases or offenders were “validated by 
two or more credible sources.” Id. at 56. “This produced a set of 561 recidivism-eligible 
individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses in the United States between September 
of 2001 and March of 2018.” Id. 
 185. Id. at 54, 60. 
 186. See id. at 60. The four recidivated by “violat[ing] plea agreement by using the 
internet,” “committ[ing] fraud by illegally buying food stamps,” “forgery and uttering,” and 
“parole violation due to drug possession.” Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 54 (explaining why “[t]hese findings suggest that restrictive policies designed 
to increase surveillance of released political extremists, such as the recently proposed 
TRACER Act and other registry-based measures, are unwarranted”). “In addition to the low 
rates of recidivism, it is also noteworthy that five of the recidivists reoffended while still 
incarcerated, dropping the total number of released recidivists to four. Those that reoffended 
in prison were charged with attempted murder and attempting to radicalize others.” Id. at 59. 
 189. Id. at 60. 
 190. Id. at 54. Hodwitz then goes on to explain that 
political offenders were less likely to recidivate than apolitical offenders and, when 
they did recidivate, they did so in the years immediately following their release. In 
other words, although political and apolitical offenders are very similar in gender, 
age, and race, there are dramatic differences between these two groups when it 
comes [to] recidivism rates and, to a lesser extent, to the length of time between 
release and rearrest. 
Id. at 61. 
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B. Young People’s Ability to Rehabilitate 
Young people’s brains are undeveloped and, therefore, more open to 
change.191  Adolescent brain maturation extends from 11 to 25 years of age; 
adolescents have reduced culpability because they are naturally predisposed 
to impulsive decision-making and negative peer influence.192  ISIS and other 
extremist groups prey on young people’s immaturity when recruiting.193  The 
Supreme Court recognizes three factors reducing adolescent criminal 
culpability: (1) a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility often resulting in impetuous decision-making, (2) adolescents 
are more susceptible to negative influence through peer pressure, and (3) 
adolescents’ characters are more transitory than those of adults.194 
Both neuroscience and developmental psychology support the factors the 
Supreme Court outlined.195  For example, in Graham v. Florida, the Supreme 
Court held that juvenile life sentences without parole for non-homicide 
offenses were unconstitutional.196  The American Medical Association and 
the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry filed an amicus 
brief stating that “[s]cientists have found that adolescents as a group, even at 
later stages of adolescence, are more likely than adults to engage in risky, 
impulsive, and sensation-seeking behavior.”197  Young people have less 
impulse control.198  They are impressionable to negative influences, 
emotionally irrational, and overestimate short-term rewards.199 
 
 191. See generally Allan Colver & Sarah Longwell, New Understanding of Adolescent 
Brain Development: Relevance to Transitional Healthcare for Young People with Long Term 
Conditions, 98 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 902 (2013). 
 192. See id. 
 193. See UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON CHILDREN RECRUITED 
AND EXPLOITED BY TERRORIST AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS: THE ROLE OF THE JUSTICE 




 194. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
 195. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 
811–19 (2003). 
 196. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). Justice Kennedy’s opinion explained 
that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit a 
juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a non-homicidal crime. 
See id. 
 197. Stephen A. Newman, Foreword: The Past, Present, and Future of Juvenile Justice 
Reform in New York State, 56 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 1263, 1289 (2012). 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. (“For example, brain imaging studies reveal that adolescents generally exhibit 
more neural activity than adults or children in areas of the brain that promote risky and 
reward-based behavior. These studies also demonstrate that the brain continues to mature, 
both structurally and functionally, throughout adolescence in regions of the brain responsible 
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The Court directly agreed with these medical experts that there are 
“fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”200  
Developmental psychologists and the Court are on the same page that 
differences between adult and adolescent decision-making should translate 
into differences in sentencing.201  The Court in Miller v. Alabama held that 
children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes, 
and that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment forbids the mandatory sentencing of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders.202  Although 
18-year-olds are considered adults, “neuroscientists [and psychologists 
agree] that the brain’s prefrontal cortex — which is responsible for the ability 
to delay gratification, exercise emotional regulation, and resist pressure — 
continuously grows well into our mid-twenties.”203  These developing 
“brains explain much of teenagers’ and adolescents’ impatience and rash 
decisions,” and therefore reduced culpability.204  Brain development 
continues into a person’s twenties and early thirties.205  In fact, some 
lawmakers have started to change criminal laws in accordance with this 
science.  For example, California lawmakers amended a law focused on 
re-sentencing juvenile offenders to include those who were under 23 years 
old at the time the crime was committed.206  Vermont allows some people up 
to age 22 to go through the family, not criminal, court system.207  
Additionally, in Europe, countries such as Germany and the Netherlands 
 
for controlling thoughts, actions, and emotions.”). Generally speaking, “the average 
adolescent cannot be expected to act with the same control or foresight as a mature adult.” Id. 
 200. Id. at 1290 (footnote omitted). 
 201. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 839–40. 
 202. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470–71 (2012). 
 203. HADAR AVIRAM, YESTERDAY’S MONSTERS: THE MANSON FAMILY CASES AND THE 
ILLUSION OF PAROLE 212 (2020). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Dana Goldstein, Should 25-Year-Olds Be Tried as Juveniles?, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/138133/25-year-olds-tried-juveniles 
[https://perma.cc/8ESN-S4MU]. 
Social change is as important as biological change in understanding why some 
people in this age group are drawn to crime. Individuals who are “disconnected” — 
neither working nor in school — are more likely to get in trouble with the law. 
While fewer young women are disconnected today than in previous decades, the 
opposite is true for young men. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 206. See AVIRAM, supra note 203, at 214. 
 207. See Goldstein, supra note 205. 
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classify all defendants up until their mid-twenties as juveniles; they are not 
tried in adult criminal court.208 
Traditionally, responses to juvenile crime have focused more on 
rehabilitation than in the adult realm.  Extremist organizations often recruit 
young people using methods “similar to those employed by sexual predators: 
gaining trust and establishing rapport, fulfilling emotional needs, and then 
isolating a victim from family and friends.”209  Social media manipulation is 
rampant in connecting young people to extremist groups.  Young people are 
recruited via social media through two primary strategies:210 (1) “grooming, 
[which] is based on the perpetrator learning about the individual’s interests 
in order to tailor the approach and build up a relationship of trust,”211 and (2) 
“targeted advertising,” where a group, “by tracking the online [behavior] of 
Internet users, . . . can identify those vulnerable to its propaganda and tailor 
the narrative to suit its target audience.”212  Internet communities become an 
echo chamber filled with others holding similar opinions.213  Young people 
often become radicalized through the internet because, as Bellevue/NYU 
Program for Survivors of Torture clinical psychologist Katherine Porterfield 
explains, “[t]hey sit in their room and they have a constant feed of language 
that enhances their sense of grievance and that the failures that they have are 
related to a larger mission.”214  They become “alienated from the people who 
would help them seek alternate routes and it fuels their future actions.”215 
ISIS maximizes its reach by sharing its message on Twitter, Facebook, 
and peer-to-peer messaging apps.216  Social media content — including 
 
 208. See id. Additionally, just because a young person is provided the opportunity to be 
charged as a juvenile and not an adult does not remove detention’s negative impact. See id. 
Research shows that even detention in a juvenile facility is “‘criminogenic,’ meaning it makes 
it more likely that a person will reoffend, compared to a juvenile who committed a similar 
crime, but was not incarcerated.” Id. 
 209. Berkell, supra note 17, at 42 (footnote omitted). 
 210. See HANDBOOK ON CHILDREN RECRUITED AND EXPLOITED, supra note 193, at 13. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 213. See Ali Chunovic, #WSF18: What Causes Extremism in the Brain?, DANA FOUND. 
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cartoons, computer games, and other interactive media217 — is focused on 
persuading possible recruits of the organization’s strength and that it is open 
to all.218  Joining an extremist group is portrayed as “offering status and 
prestige, smart uniforms and weapons.”219  The experience is illustrated as 
an opportunity for power, especially to those without educational 
opportunities or employment.220  ISIS recruitment also often focuses on 
“victimhood,” utilizing visuals that inspire “a desire to carry out revenge.”221  
In a material support case with nine young defendants, a judge found it 
difficult to consider long sentences because the defendants were “malleable 
youths who were ensnared by sly recruiting tactics: They were often lured 
into the group with invitations to pick-up basketball games, which were 
followed by late-night screenings of jihadist YouTube videos.”222 
Law enforcement officials rely on community partnerships to help root 
out extremism, but this trust in law enforcement is broken when young 
people are aggressively prosecuted for non-violent crimes of terrorism.223  
For example, Sal Shafi notified the FBI that his 21-year-old son, Adam, was 
engaging with extremist communities online.224  The worried father assisted 
the FBI with their investigation, but ultimately thought his son just needed 
counseling and community support.225  The government charged Adam with 
attempting to provide material support to the al-Nusra Front; he faced a 
prison sentence of up to 20 years.226  Adam awaited trial in solitary 
confinement.227  Mr. Shafi now warns parents who face similar dilemmas to 
“not . . . even consider involving the authorities.”228  The Shafi family’s 
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situation represents how prosecution, not rehabilitation, is the government’s 
most common immediate response and ultimate solution to young people 
engaging with extremist ideas. 
i. United States v. Ceasar: Why an EDNY Judge Disregarded Sentencing 
Recommendations for a Young Material Support Defendant 
Some district court judges use a framework of lessened culpability for 
young defendants, even those charged with material support to ISIS.  In 
United States v. Ceasar, EDNY Judge Weinstein granted a 24-year-old 
defendant charged with material support to ISIS a four-year sentence — a 
dramatic downward departure from the 30 to 50 years the government 
recommended.229  For at least 11 months, Ceasar had actively sought to 
support and assist ISIS.230  Ceasar showed her support by encouraging 
people, via social media, to join and assist ISIS.231  Ceasar planned to travel 
to ISIS territory.232 
Judge Weinstein considered many mitigating factors in her sentencing, 
including that her family repeatedly abused and neglected her.233  She was 
forced to participate in ceremonial marriages with men many years older and 
was abused and neglected by multiple foster families.234  Ceasar’s living 
situation was often unstable — at times she lived in homeless shelters.235 
Judge Weinstein concluded that “[t]he ideal sentence, in the court’s 
estimation following the hearing, would be Defendant’s placement in a 
deradicalization or disengagement program with provision for intensive 
educational, emotional, and economic support to address her childhood 
trauma and its attendant results.”236  Judge Weinstein’s focus on treatment, 
as opposed to incarceration, speaks to the values society holds for young 
people — they are susceptible to negative influences, their brains are not 
fully developed, and they deserve opportunities deemed unfit for those who 
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are older.  There is less reason to incapacitate a young person because there 
is more reason to trust the young defendant can, and wants to, alter their life’s 
path. 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF TERRORISM-RELATED DIVERSION 
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND 
Part III examines the current state of terrorism-related diversion programs 
in the United States and around the world.  Section III.A examines the only 
terrorism diversion program in the United States, located in the District of 
Minnesota.  Section III.B explores what can be learned from other countries, 
focusing on Western Europe and Saudi Arabia, who use diversion programs 
to deradicalize.  III.C explains the pitfalls of diversion programs generally 
and the pitfalls of countering violent extremism programs specifically. 
A. Minneapolis’s Diversion Program for a Young Person Charged with 
Material Support 
The District of Minnesota created the only diversion program in the 
country for a young person charged with a terrorism-related offense.237  
Judge Michael J. Davis of the District of Minnesota approved the program 
in 2016.238  The program aimed to rehabilitate the young defendants “to 
becom[e] successful, law-abiding citizens,” to supervise and monitor 
defendants pre-trial and post-incarceration, and to provide the court with 
information useful for sentencing people charged with crimes of terrorism.239  
Judge Davis decided young people who acted as ISIS recruiters should be 
given the opportunity to improve their lives through a process of 
re-pluralization.240  “Re-pluralization,” coined by German radicalization 
expert Daniel Koehler,241 is “the careful reintroduction of problems and 
solutions into a radicalized person’s life so that they can no longer devote all 
their mental energy to stewing over their paranoia.”242  It is helping young 
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people understand that life and problem solving can be seen in complex 
shades of gray, as opposed to binary black and white. 
i. The Minneapolis Diversion Program’s History 
Before the arrests of nine young Somali-American youths, there were 
already community conversations about how to prevent radicalization in 
Minneapolis’s Somali community.  This started when the Obama 
Administration, in 2011, released the first national strategy to prevent violent 
extremism domestically.243  The strategy focused on community-based 
approaches, believing that knowledgeable and supported families, 
communities, and organizations are the best defense against violent 
extremism.244  Three cities participated in the pilot program: Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, Boston, and Los Angeles.245  A listening tour then took place in 
Minneapolis.246  They discussed community-identified root causes of 
radicalization: “disaffected youth,” “a deepening disconnect between youth 
and religious leaders,” “internal identity crises,” “community isolation[,] and 
lack of opportunity — including high unemployment, lack of activities for 
youth, and few mentors.”247 
Subsequently, in 2014 and 2015, nine Somali-American youths aged 18 
to 22 were charged with conspiring to provide material support to ISIS.248  
Six of the teenagers pled guilty.249  The three other teenagers went to trial in 
what was deemed “America’s largest ISIS recruitment trial.”250  The six 
young men who pleaded guilty were sentenced to prison or rehabilitation.251  
Abdullahi Yusuf, who was 18 at the time of his offense, agreed to 
rehabilitation.252 
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ii. Critical Aspects of the Minneapolis Program 
Judge Davis, along with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of 
Minnesota, created a pilot program — the District of Minnesota’s Terrorism 
Disengagement and Deradicalization Program.253  The program aimed to 
combat the fact that “[u]ntreated radicalized individuals [would] infect 
communities and continue to seek opportunities to harm others and martyr 
themselves.”254  Yusuf began the program pre-sentencing after he pled guilty 
to material support charges and cooperated with the government.255 
Yusuf, who was born in a Kenyan refugee camp, immigrated to 
Minneapolis with his family after they fled conflict in Somalia.256  He 
attended high school in Minneapolis and was on the football team.257  Yusuf 
became “part of a . . . pattern in which children of some immigrant families 
in North America and Europe feel alienated from society[;] a small but 
concerning few turn to jihad.”258  At his co-conspirators’ trial, Yusuf testified 
about the radicalization process: 
[It] was frightening simple.  It began with a meal at a Somali restaurant and 
a pickup game of basketball . . . . [S]mart phones came out of their pockets 
and the young men began watching ISIS videos on a YouTube channel 
called “Enter the Truth.”  They stayed up until 2 a.m . . . . talking about the 
killing in Syria and watching ISIS videos.259 
Yusuf further explained that “[t]he channel is saying that the West is corrupt 
and you can follow religion perfectly over there [in Syria] . . . [a]nd you 
don’t have to conform to anyone else’s traditions.”260 
Judge Davis appointed Daniel Koehler, the founder of the German 
Institute for Radicalization and Deradicalization Studies and a fellow at 
George Washington University’s Program on Extremism, to create the 
program.261  Koehler explained that he 
ha[s] already seen fierce criticism from the law-and-order people, saying 
these are terrorists and they don’t deserve to be treated by any 
program, . . . . [b]ut we need to have another option, because we can’t kill 
or imprison our way out of why ISIS looks cool to these kids.262 
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Koehler further described that “[t]he US, unfortunately, is about 20 or 25 
years behind European countries in building these kinds of networks and 
programs.  Intervention to counter violent extremism is really missing.”263  
Koehler thinks the program is not only useful to deradicalize individuals, but 
also to cultivate trust with the communities that are most at risk for 
radicalization.264  Koehler’s theory of change for these young people is 
through re-pluralization — learning to see life and problem-solving in the 
gray, not stark black and white.  Successful re-pluralization, “los[ing] the 
fervor that once made them eager to [harm others],” requires substantial 
resources, including an “intervention coordinator” and multiple mentors who 
work with the client for years.265 
Yusuf’s process of re-pluralization entailed incremental stages of 
freedom,266 family and individual therapy, and lengthy reading lists.267  
Heartland Democracy, a small Minneapolis-based nonprofit, was hired to 
help facilitate the program for Yusuf because of its work with Somali youth 
in Minneapolis.268  Heartland Democracy’s executive director, Mary 
McKinley, took an existing program entitled “Empowering You” and 
customized it for Yusuf, “[t]he idea [being] to make disaffected young 
people and their parents feel more connected, to each other and to their 
communities.”269  McKinley stated that the “program works with young 
people to connect with themselves, their community and their world.  We 
believe that when young people make bad choices — some extremely bad 
choices — there’s still an opportunity to turn your life around.”270 
McKinley worked in conjunction with Ahmed Amin, a local 
Somali-American high school social studies teacher.271  Amin served as 
Yusuf’s primary counselor and described his empathy for Yusuf: 
I understand the difficulties of identity that lead people to join organizations 
like ISIS . . . .  It is hard trying to live in two worlds.  From 9 to 5 these kids 
have to live one way when they are at school, they are socialized to be 
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American.  And then they go home, learn to be religious and are trying to 
cope with that.  It is harder than you’d think.272 
During his year at a federal halfway house, Yusuf read philosophy, 
biography, and literature; he wrote essays and poetry, reflecting on his life, 
his choices, and his future; and he was encouraged to debate with mentors 
and Muslim community leaders.273  Amin introduced Yusuf to many 
different texts so that he “could really challenge how he thinks and sees the 
world.”274  Yusuf also read and discussed the works of Sherman Alexie, 
Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, and Michel Foucault, with the aim of 
“work[ing] through barriers, both mental and societal.”275 
Of the nine Somali teenagers who were originally charged with conspiring 
to provide material support to ISIS in 2016, only Yusuf was deemed 
trustworthy enough for a time-served sentence and therefore immediate 
release after two years of incarceration and one year in the re-pluralization 
program.276  At Yusuf’s sentencing, Judge Davis declared, “I just don’t see 
how prison will help this boy”277 — Yusuf was ultimately sentenced to 20 
years of supervised release.278  At Yusuf’s sentencing, his PO testified that 
“while in the halfway house, Yusuf earned his high school diploma, 
underwent counseling and participated in community service.  Yusuf even 
became a role model for other residents.”279  One of Yusuf’s lawyers 
explained, “[h]is transformation has been incredible.  He went from being a 
surly, closed-down kid to this really open, warm, intelligent, thoughtful, 
introspective young man, who recognizes why he’d been attracted to Isis and 
why there are so many other options for him.”280  Yusuf’s success 
pre-sentencing was one step toward gaining additional freedoms.  Upon his 
release, Judge Davis ordered supervised release conditions that included 
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approval of all education and employment plans.281  Additionally, Yusuf’s 
internet use was monitored, he was tracked via GPS, and he was not 
permitted to access extremist materials or use social media.282  Yusuf will 
live under supervised release for 20 years unless Judge Davis decides to 
reduce his term.283 
B. What Can Be Learned from Other Countries That Successfully 
Utilize These Programs 
For decades, other nations have regularly utilized deradicalization and 
disengagement programs with the goal to deradicalize those facing crimes of 
terrorism, both pre-trial and after conviction.284  Previously, European 
rehabilitation programs were directed at violent right-wing extremists, such 
as neo-Nazis and nationalist extremists.285  Recently, European 
programming turned its focus to Jihadist-inspired extremists.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, or both oversee 
more than 40 terrorism-related diversion programs throughout the world.286  
A crucial difference between those charged with terrorism-related crimes in 
the United States versus elsewhere is that terrorism sentences are generally 
shorter in other countries.287  Rehabilitation is needed quickly because 
defendants will be released in a matter of months, as opposed to possible 
decades in the United States.288 
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Nations other than the United States “have experienced more immediate 
and extensive threats from young people joining extremist groups”; these 
countries have utilized a holistic approach by implementing alternative to 
incarceration programs centered on mental health, economic opportunities, 
and family and religious counseling.289  Countries such as Germany, 
Northern Ireland, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, the United Kingdom, and Malaysia 
have implemented diversion programs for potentially radicalized 
individuals.290  This diverse group of nations’ programs utilize rehabilitative 
opportunities that can lead to lessened jail time.291 
Many European countries have designed and used intensive 
disengagement and deradicalization programs to assist people charged and 
convicted of terrorism-related offenses.  These programs have many 
successes.  One such success occurred in a Danish town where over 300 
young people completed a deradicalization rehabilitation program — the 
town went “from thirty [young people joining ISIS] in 2013 to only one the 
following year.”292  Additionally, Germany’s Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees partners with NGOs, such as HAYAT,293 “to counter violent 
Islamist extremism using a counseling approach.”294  Germany offers a 
national hotline for radicalization counseling.295  The hotline accepts 
anyone’s calls and directs them to HAYAT.296  HAYAT received 
international acclaim for its individualized counseling for people “on a path 
toward Jihadist-inspired violent extremism.”297 
Furthermore, the NGO Reprieve created a “Life After Guantánamo” 
program to help re-settle people who were detained at Guantánamo Bay and 
released to countries that were not their home countries.298  The program 
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aims to help former Guantánamo detainees receive services, support, and 
counseling, including assistance with integration, family reunification, 
housing, education, and employment.299  Reprieve arranged holistic services 
“to 38 struggling ex-prisoners in 18 countries.”300  The U.S. government had 
tortured all of the program participants.301  Thus, the holistic nature of the 
program was vital to their rehabilitation.302  Without the Life After 
Guantánamo program, these participants would likely “be abandoned, 
stigmatized and lack access to services necessary to overcome a range of 
psychological and physical illnesses.”303 
Not all deradicalization programs are successful.  For example, in May 
2016, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls publicized “that France [would] 
open a dozen de-radicalization centers.”304  This program closed after five 
months.305  In the French program, participants “worked with teachers, 
psychologists, and imams in a rural chateau in the Loire Valley to discuss 
religion and jihadi ideologies.”306  However, halal food was not provided for 
the participants, and “they studied French history, philosophy, and literature, 
wore uniforms, and sang the national anthem.”307  Even the program’s Imam 
was not allowed to keep a halal diet.308  New America researchers Elena 
Sourin and Spandana Singh explain that the French deradicalization program 
failed for two reasons.  First, “although the center wanted to address the root 
causes of radicalization and had psychologists on staff,” the program 
over-emphasized “ideology by trying to replace extremism with a secular 
‘counter-truth.’”309  Second, “the program promoted Western nationalist 
identities over Islamic ones, an especially fraught move in France, given the 
country’s long-standing tensions around laïcité, the legal principle that 
promotes secularism in theory but, to many critics, seems more focused on 
limiting Muslims’ ability to observe Islam.”310  These mistakes made 
deradicalization unlikely.  Ultimately the researchers suggested that a more 
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holistic and therapeutic-focused program, where community organizations 
directly work with participants, would more effectively help individuals 
rehabilitate, as well as protect, their legal rights.311 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia has extensive deradicalization programs and 
has touted very low recidivism rates,312 with success rates of up to 87%.313  
The Saudi program includes in-prison counseling and religious re-education, 
in which 5,000 people participated.314  The program features several key 
components: the “presumption of benevolence,” a halfway house-type 
structure where mental health professionals and imams provide services, and 
the practice of “respected Islamic scholars correct[ing] what they consider 
warped interpretations of Islam.” 315 
However, there have been significant failures within the program.316  Such 
failures include that “310 to 390 graduates have ‘relapsed’ into 
extremism.”317  In addition, the Saudi program includes aspects that would 
not work in the United States, such as finding male defendants a wife and 
buying them a car.318  Furthermore, the religious aspects of the “program 
would not be culturally viable in the United States or legally [viable] under 
the First Amendment.”319  Thus, the Saudi program likely is not replicable 
in the United States due to religious and cultural differences, and because the 
program is used for defendants convicted of all levels of terrorism — violent 
and non-violent, significant and minor. 
Overall, deradicalization programs’ “existence is evidence of a 
commitment to dealing with the problem of radicalization by focusing on 
rehabilitation.”320  A defendant can be sentenced to participate in such a 
diversion program321 and a sentence could be lessened or eliminated, should 
the participant successfully complete the program. 
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C. Avoiding Pitfalls of Diversion Programs Generally and Countering 
Violent Extremism Programs Specifically 
i. Pitfalls of Diversion Programs 
Diversion programs are far from perfect.  As criminologist Darryl Davies 
stated in 1976, “[d]iversion is part of what I call the ‘Bartholomew Effect in 
Penology’; that is, in our eagerness to devise alternatives to imprisonment, 
we may merely replace one method with another; creating more problems in 
the process.”322  There are significant liberty interests at stake for a defendant 
and an individual could easily consent to a diversion or alternative to 
incarceration program without being fully aware of his loss of rights.323  
Thus, a person charged with a crime may choose to participate in a program 
without realizing he could have been acquitted of the charge in a criminal 
court.324 
These diversion program problems continue today.  The Vera Institute of 
Justice cautions, “[b]ecause these courts hold the promise of addressing 
problems faced by many people who come into contact with the criminal 
justice system, experts counsel that courts should partner with and follow the 
guidance of those who are trained in clinically appropriate methods, to avoid 
ordering inadequate or misapplied treatment.”325  Defendants should be 
aware of each component of a diversion program and should not be forced 
to participate without knowing the extensive pros and cons of their 
selection.326  Diversion should not serve as the government forcing change 
on an individual — the individual should be interested in changing 
themselves and should not lose all autonomy in their say of how best to do 
so. 
Furthermore, another pitfall of any alternative to incarceration program is 
fear of the “Willie Horton effect” — that program success is thwarted by 
individual failures.  Willie Horton was an incarcerated person who was 
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granted permission to participate in a weekend-leave program.327  On one 
such weekend, Horton “brutally raped a woman and assaulted her 
boyfriend.”328  Professor John Pfaff explained that “Horton was an outlier 
[because] more than 99% of those allowed to go home on leaves returned 
without incident.”329  In 1988, during his successful run for president, 
George Bush Senior utilized Horton’s case in an infamous attack ad that 
some claimed won Bush the presidency.330  Pfaff stated that “[a]lthough the 
impact of the ad on the outcome of the election has been overstated, 
politicians quickly learned its lesson.  No matter how successful an ‘early 
release’ prison program is, one single failure can impose huge political 
costs.”331  Potential individual failures, along with many programs’ 
shortcomings, illustrate how diversion programs are imperfect. 
ii. Pitfalls of Countering Violent Extremism Programs 
Countering violent extremism (CVE) is “a catchall term for terrorism 
prevention strategies that critics say [can] stigmatize Muslims and yield few 
or no measurable results.”332  In 2011, the Obama Administration released a 
strategic implementation plan with the overarching goal of “preventing 
violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, 
financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit 
acts of violence.”333  CVE refers to four stages: prevention, intervention, 
rehabilitation, and reintegration.334  Diversion is included in the latter two 
categories, given that these categories take place after arrest. 
Additionally, community policing, sometimes a CVE aspect, comes with 
its own pitfalls.  In Policing Terrorists in the Community, Sahar Aziz 
explained critiques of community policing in counterterrorism, including 
that individuals are divided into categories of “Good Muslims” or “Bad 
Muslims” depending on their willingness to cooperate with the federal 
government, and that Muslim community leaders are selected “to gather and 
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share seemingly innocuous information about their communities” that 
ultimately may be used by law enforcement.335 
Thus, some worry that CVE programs are used as a front for domestic 
intelligence gathering.336  A group of human rights, civil liberties, and 
community-based organizations wrote to Deputy National Security Advisor 
Lisa Monaco expressing their concerns about the CVE programs.337  They 
described the possible impact of the targeting of Muslim-American 
communities and communities presumed to be Muslim, and broadly 
addressed “religious exercise; freedom of expression; government 
preference for or interference in religion; stigmatization of American 
Muslims; and ongoing abusive surveillance and monitoring practices.”338  
The groups recommended not to involve U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the FBI 
in CVE programs given their lead involvement in investigations and 
prosecutions.339 
IV. AN SDNY-EDNY DIVERSION PROGRAM FOR YOUNG PEOPLE 
CHARGED WITH MATERIAL SUPPORT 
Part IV explains the feasibility of a joint SDNY-EDNY diversion program 
for young people charged with material support.  Section IV.A highlights 
EDNY judges who have requested such a program be developed.  Section 
IV.B explains how the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New 
York created its own deradicalization program merely a few years ago.  
Section IV.C lays out the major considerations for an SDNY-EDNY 
diversion program tailored for young people charged with material support. 
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A. Judges Who Have Expressed A Need for Material Support 
Diversion Programs 
At least two EDNY judges have expressed the need for a diversion 
program created specifically for young people charged with material support.  
As discussed above in Section II.B.i, Judge Weinstein stated the importance 
of material support diversion programs in United States v. Ceasar.340  Judge 
Weinstein explicitly stated that a program should be created for defendants 
like Ceasar: 
In Europe, countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands have designed 
and used intensive disengagement and deradicalization programs to assist 
prisoners charged and convicted of terrorism-related offenses.  The United 
States has no such program.  The Bureau of Prisons should seriously 
consider designing an appropriate program to deal with American terrorists 
like this one.  Without access to treatment while incarcerated or on 
supervised release, Defendant will likely remain an unrehabilitated 
supporter of ISIL and a continuing danger to the United States.341 
Judge Weinstein made clear that diversion programs serve not only to help 
the individual and reduce their incarceration time, but also to directly combat 
radicalization.  This is especially true given that material support defendants 
are rarely, if ever, incapacitated for life.342 
EDNY Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy presented similar thoughts in 
United States v. Augustine.343  Bernard Augustine was charged with 
attempting to provide material support to ISIS.344  Family turmoil roused 
Augustine to leave his parents’ home.345  At 18 years old, he flew to 
Tunisia,346 where he was arrested and sentenced to two years in a Tunisian 
prison.347  After serving his sentence, the FBI collected him from Tunisia 
and charged him with material support in the United States.348  Judge Levy 
expressed the need for a diversion program during Augustine’s bond hearing: 
There is no alternative to incarceration program for people who were young 
who went to, you know, to join ISIS, at least not in this district.  If there 
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were, that would be something that would be, I think, useful in a situation 
like this.  But we don’t have that.  And the safeguards that would come with 
that we don’t have.349 
Here, Judge Levy exemplified a nearly identical point as Judge Weinstein: 
an alternative to incarceration program is necessary to rehabilitate and 
reintegrate defendants and also a more humane option than incarceration.  
But no such program exists.  Given these judges’ desires to see a diversion 
program enacted, their interest and influence should be considered in helping 
to ensure an effective program. 
B. U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York Created 
a Deradicalization Program 
In 2018 and before, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New 
York created the Disruption and Early Engagement Program (DEEP).350  
DEEP was devised as “a strategic public/private partnership aimed at 
reducing the threat of terrorism by building a pool of subject matter experts 
across disciplines.”351  A diverse range of players were involved, including 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys, the Federal Defenders of New York, mental health 
professionals, the Probation Department, Pretrial Services, and other 
individuals focused on curtailing violent extremism.352 
The program’s main advocate, former EDNY National Security & 
Cybercrime Section Chief Seth DuCharme, touted DEEP during the 2018 
ISIS prosecution of John Doe.353  Although DEEP never became an official 
diversion program within the EDNY court, at least one EDNY defendant 
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participated in DEEP through a collaboration with the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
and defense counsel.  In one case, John Doe, a U.S. citizen, then 
25-years-old, joined ISIS in Syria; for five months, “he served ISIS in an 
administrative role.”354  Doe was “present in at least one battle, he received 
military training, he carried firearms, and he was introduced to explosive 
belts used to blow up civilians.”355  Doe cooperated with the government 
and, through DEEP, he participated in terrorism prevention education and 
helped prevent a juvenile from continuing on the path toward jihadism.356  
The government’s own expert witness at Doe’s sentencing hearing, Deputy 
Director of George Washington University’s Program on Extremism Seamus 
Hughes, recommended requiring further counseling and mentoring support 
for Doe post-sentence; Hughes also proposed offering “an ‘individualized 
approach,’ creating a ‘cocoon’ around the defendant comprised of 
community groups, law enforcement, religious leaders, and others.”357  Part 
of the government’s interest in DEEP was its fear that Doe could be 
“re-radicalized in prison.”358  For this reason, the government’s expert 
“concluded that supervised release, rather than incarceration, would increase 
[the] defendant’s chances to be rehabilitated.”359 
Notably, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Fiscal Year 2021 
budget request includes, “[i]n addition to traditional prosecution options, 
[Department of Justice] is expanding implementation of its [DEEP] model, 
which assesses the degree of threat posed by particular subjects and develops 
options to mitigate the threat and divert or disrupt mobilization to 
violence.”360  In July 2020, DuCharme was named the new Acting U.S. 
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York.361  Political will is a necessity 
for the implementation of any diversion program, let alone one for people 
charged with crimes of terrorism.  Given DuCharme’s previous interest in 
DEEP and DHS’s possible financial commitment, there may now be the 
political will from Acting U.S. Attorney DuCharme as the new EDNY head. 
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C. What an SDNY-EDNY Diversion Program Could Look Like 
Keeping the pitfalls discussed in Section A.ii in mind, it is important to 
consider the many positive aspects of a material support diversion program.  
Given the government’s appetite for charging young people with material 
support, along with “the preemptive nature of the prohibitions,” an 
alternative to incarceration program for young people charged with material 
support is imperative.362 
EDNY and SDNY are uniquely situated to offer an alternative to 
incarceration program for young people charged or convicted of material 
support.  Nearly one-fifth of all ISIS-related charges are brought in SDNY 
or EDNY.363  Logistically, the two districts already offer three alternative to 
incarceration programs for young defendants.364  These programs are offered 
as both an alternative to incarceration and as a re-entry tool to limit 
recidivism.365  EDNY in particular is uniquely positioned to host diversion 
programs given its previous implementation of DEEP and its history as one 
of the first federal districts to offer alternative to incarceration options in as 
early as 2000.366  In the case of material support-connected programs, EDNY 
could further lead.  Because EDNY and SDNY pre-trial officers are already 
actively involved with managing diversion programs, these officers are 
prepared, and even eager, to contribute to reducing the federal prison 
population, especially for young defendants.367  As discussed in Section 
III.C.ii, a coalition of human rights, civil liberties, and Muslim-American 
community-based organizations recommend that U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
and the FBI not be connected with CVE programs given their lead 
involvement in investigations and prosecutions.368  Community 
organizations, probation officers, and judges are better situated to oversee 
these programs given they are certainly more neutral than the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office. 
This Note, drawing on these themes, other nations’ deradicalization 
efforts, and the Minnesota program’s success, expands upon those ideas to 
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explain how re-pluralization, choice, the role of family and community, and 
the ability to make some mistakes are also key matters to consider when 
devising a diversion program for people charged with material support.  
Below are general pillars for a material support alternative to incarceration 
program that considers the pitfalls of diversion programs generally and CVE 
programs specifically. 
i. Re-Pluralization 
Re-pluralization is the careful reintroduction of problems and solutions 
into a radicalized person’s life, so that they actively choose to stop their 
dichotomous, overly suspicious thinking.369  Re-pluralization “encourages 
reflection about whether a certain course of action is absolutely necessary, 
providing room for further intervention.”370  In other words, radicalization is 
de-pluralization — “only recogniz[ing] problems, solutions and future 
scenarios associated with a specific ideology and not perceive[ing] 
alternative frames and interpretations of core political values.”371  Coiner 
Daniel Koehler further explains that if one’s de-pluralization is “based on 
devaluing other humans,” the radicalization process then leads to “use of 
violence as the only perceived feasible option to solve that psychological 
tension.”372  Thus, re-pluralization is centered on learning problem-solving 
skills that, as Koehler explains, “relieves the tension between the ideological 
urgency to act and the lack of alternative solutions.”373  Understanding that 
life is not binary is an important first step; the second step is then channeling 
energy into activities that fit with a participant’s new mindset.  Koehler 
traveled to Minneapolis to train probation officers who would work with 
Yusuf in the re-pluralization-focused program.374  Koehler trained officers 
with lessons designed to assist with counseling people experiencing 
extremist thinking.375  For example, in one exercise, Koehler showed a 
hypothetical teen’s Facebook history, which indicated the hypothetical 
young person was “in the midst of being radicalized by the Islamic State.”376  
The social media history included a range of topics — everything from 
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“anguished posts about his fictional father’s disapproval of his new lifestyle” 
to “comments on videos about the jihadis.”377  The officers were supposed 
to notice that several of the posts featured images related to photography — 
for example, one photograph, captioned “Jihad Is Beautiful,” presented a 
group of Islamic State soldiers looking at the screen of a digital camera.378  
Koehler’s point was to illustrate the teen had once dreamed of becoming a 
photojournalist and that his re-pluralization should therefore include this 
passion for photography.379 
Participants in re-pluralization education learn to understand why they 
were driven to extremist views and develop appropriate problem-solving 
skills.  For example, a program participant could learn through analysis of 
the push-pull factors.  Daisy Khan is the Executive Director of the Women’s 
Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equality and the editor of WiseUp: 
Knowledge Ends Extremism, a book representing “a community-led effort to 
address the issue of the rise of extremism, wherever it might be, but, also, to 
prevent the rise of Islamophobia in this country.”380  Khan refers to push-pull 
factors as those that draw someone toward an FTO (the push: kindness from 
ISIS online community members) and those that draw someone away from 
western society (the pull: having one’s hijab pulled off while walking to 
school).381  Khan is clear that many people drawn to ISIS are not motivated 
by the extremist ideology, but actually social isolation, trauma, and yearning 
for a life purpose.382  Extremist groups’ effective manipulation allows 
disaffected young people to feel connected to a broader community and 
purpose.383  Part of re-pluralization is first understanding the various 
push-pull factors in one’s life and then choosing to change behavior 
accordingly.  The participant will begin to re-pluralize when he more fully 
understands the root cause of his interest in extremist ideologies and then 
recognizes that the singular organization cannot solve his problems.  By 
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understanding the root cause of problems, individuals can then begin to see 
life in nuanced shades of gray, actively choosing to abandon their 
de-pluralized, binary thoughts and actions. 
ii. Choice 
Many of diversion programs’ pitfalls stem from a lack of choice and 
therefore a lack of autonomy.384  For example, although the Minneapolis 
program provided Yusuf the choice, and ultimately the opportunity, to 
participate, Judge Davis did not permit other defendants to participate after 
a one-time set date.385  If a person is to change, they must be ready to take 
an active role in their life.  Choice about education, programs, activities, or 
employment is a key aspect in allowing participants to begin to exercise 
autonomy over their own lives.  For example, the Minneapolis program gave 
Yusuf options from which he could choose.386  Some small: which books to 
read and review with his mentor.387  And some more significant: whether to 
cease association with other suspects, who were friends.388  By actively 
making choices for oneself, the program participant takes action steps to 
re-pluralize. 
Choice is further discussed below as related to the role of family and 
community. 
iii. The Role of Family and Community 
Koehler believes that to be successful in re-pluralization, one must have 
stable and supportive relationships throughout rehabilitation.389  This entails 
including community-based organizations, as opposed to merely probation 
officers, in the rehabilitation process.  Koehler further explained that family 
therapy, if available, is key to ideological rehabilitation.390  Koehler 
recommends groups not connected with the government, including Families 
for Life, which was founded by Nicola Benyahia after her son joined ISIS 
and died fighting on their behalf.391  These groups are more likely to 
positively impact people charged with material support because their staff 
and volunteers can speak with personal knowledge about the program 
participants’ experiences.  This personal knowledge, that a probation officer 
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would likely not have, helps to create stronger bonds, which are needed for 
personal emotional growth. 
Another element of choice is the inclusion of one’s family, or other 
support sources, in the rehabilitation process.  Family, or other community 
support, is crucial in ensuring that changes made while in the program 
continue after the individual returns home.  One example is the group Parents 
for Peace.392  The group originally started as a support group for family, 
friends, and individuals who are former extremists or the relative of a former 
extremist.393  Parents for Peace aims “to reframe extremism as a public health 
emergency” and “to put human faces to a problem typically addressed as a 
national security issue.”394  Members include the wife of a former Klansman, 
a man who identifies as a former neo-Nazi, and the aunt of a young man who 
died in Somalia while attempting to join ISIS.395  The group’s most 
well-known member is self-described “former Islamic jihadist” Tania Joya, 
whose ex-husband is Yahya al-Bahrumi, former highest-ranking American 
ISIS Commander.396  The key aspects of Parents for Peace include “a 
no-judgment zone,” allowing members from all different radicalized 
backgrounds397 to participate with the goal “to set aside partisan differences 
and present a unified front against extremism.”398  This no-judgement zone 
allows for an individual to participate in the community, even while still 
wavering on deciding to deradicalize or not.399  Mixed-ideology groups 
allow participants to focus on life decisions and root causes, as opposed to 
shared ideology.  The no-judgment zone allows different extremist group 
members to realize the commonalities of said groups — preying on 
vulnerable youth, manipulation via social media, intense sense of 
community, and the requirement of extreme thought to participate in severe 
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actions.400  As one Parents for Peace member explained, “[l]eaving was like 
kicking an addiction.  ‘When you’re coming off of hate and extremism, it’s 
the same process . . . .  You’ve got to have a support group.  You’ve got to 
have a network.’”401  In order for participants to share common ground about 
the ways various extremist ideologies are similarly unhealthy, the 
SDNY-EDNY program should include members of different ideological 
backgrounds.  Otherwise, participants may be too enmeshed in their own 
thinking and ideology.  Groups like Parents for Peace should be considered 
for contracts. 
Another crucial aspect is the want to change — even if the desire to change 
comes from a loved one and not from the individual extremist-thinker 
himself.402  Inspiration from family members or other loved ones is critical 
for change to actually occur.403  Because not all material support defendants 
are charged in jurisdictions they call home or where they have community, 
the opportunity to participate in a program based in another jurisdiction is 
also key. 
iv. Opportunity to “Fail” Without Drastic Repercussions 
Young people will make mistakes.  And as one Parents for Peace member 
shared, “[l]eaving was like kicking an addiction.”404  In a similar vein, 
Koehler explained that because extremist radicalization promises that 
believers “will immediately start to change society and live out their ideals, 
. . . newly minted extremists often experience feelings of euphoria, much like 
addicts who’ve just discovered the drug that will be their doom.”405  As 
clinical psychologist Katherine Porterfield explained at Ceasar’s sentencing 
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hearing, just as alcoholics or those addicted to drugs can relapse, individuals 
struggling with extremist beliefs can also relapse.406  Relapses occur because 
the trajectory of progress rarely goes in “a straight line.”407  Porterfield 
explained that although relapses often lead to negative collateral 
consequences, sometimes relapses produce positive impacts for those in 
therapy;408 a relapse gives a therapist and client the “meat” to work together 
to analyze the choices that led to the relapse.409  Whether a person relapses 
by using drugs after staying sober, returning to an abusive partner, or 
re-connecting with members of an FTO, there is room for growth, and deeper 
understanding of one’s root problems, post-relapse.410  A relapse for a 
material support defendant does not necessarily mean a violent act.  For 
example, in Yusuf’s early days living in a halfway house after his arrest, he 
“relapsed” by hoarding a box cutter under his bed — a clear violation of 
halfway-house protocols.411  Additionally, while out on bond, Ceasar 
re-connected with the online ISIS community.412  Both situations involved 
young people, Ceasar, then 23, and Yusuf, then 19, committing serious 
violations of their supervised release requirements.413  Either situation could 
have warranted a judge deciding that the person was not worthy of further 
chances, but in both cases, the judges deemed each defendant still worthy of 
a second, or even third, chance.414  Program officials should expect that, 
similar to a relapse, some mistakes will happen and that each participant 
should receive the opportunity for an individualized hearing to determine 
their ongoing suitability for the program. 
These four categories — re-pluralization, choice, family and community, 
and the opportunity to fail without drastic repercussions — are some of the 
necessary considerations for creating an SDNY-EDNY alternative to 
incarceration program for young people charged with material support.  
Alternatives to incarceration are needed not only because young people 
deserve the opportunity to grow but also because it is in the nation’s best 
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national security interest.  First-time radicalization, as well as deepening 
radicalization, can occur in prison.415  Other nations have more robust 
deradicalization programs because they recognize prison time greatly 
impacts their national security.416  Additionally, monetary costs are 
comparable for imprisonment or diversion programs.417  And the science is 
clear — human brains develop up until the mid to late twenties.418  Young 
people’s brains are undeveloped and, therefore, more open to change; young 
people have reduced culpability because they are naturally predisposed to 
impulsive decision making and negative peer influence.419  Furthermore, 
when material support defendants are not incarcerated, they are still heavily 
surveilled on supervised release.420  The intensity of supervised release is 
mitigated by the fact there has been very little recidivism of those convicted 
of crimes of terror since September 11.421  It is best for the broader 
community if the defendant has an opportunity to deradicalize. 
There is the possibility of a Willie Horton effect.  If the Willie Horton 
effect occurred for rape and assault,422 it would occur if terrorist activity 
originated from someone who completed a diversion program.  It is 
important to consider that almost all people convicted of material support 
will eventually be released, whether that is after incapacitation, a diversion 
program, or some combination of both.  Unfortunately, further terror activity 
can never be permanently ruled out.  This Note proposes it is more ethical 
and effective to strive, and possibly fail, to rehabilitate the young material 
support defendant as opposed to allowing them to possibly further radicalize 
in prison.423 
CONCLUSION 
The material support statutes have great breadth.  And with great breadth 
should come extremely individualized decisions so that no one person is 
incapacitated for longer than necessary.  Given the extensive literature and 
common understanding that young people deserve different opportunities 
from our criminal legal system, there should be more rehabilitation and 
reintegration opportunities for young people charged with material support.  
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Furthermore, it is in the nation’s public safety interests to focus on 
rehabilitation given the majority of material support defendants are young 
Americans who will return home after incarceration.  Rehabilitation is a 
necessity given the alarming data about radicalization in prison.  No matter 
where on the radicalization spectrum, it is best for the broader community if 
the defendant has an opportunity to deradicalize. 
One of the first steps in combatting radicalization should be providing 
smarter, more effective opportunities to re-pluralize those who are, or could 
be, radicalized.  EDNY and SDNY should expand upon the work of the 
District of Minnesota and create their own diversion program for young 
people charged with material support.  With a robust pre-trial services team 
knowledgeable about alternatives to incarceration programming and nearly 
one-fifth of all ISIS-related cases charged in EDNY and SDNY, these two 
districts could serve as the nation’s leader in brave, necessary, and 
compassionate rehabilitation.  A tailored diversion program for young 
people charged with material support will combat excessively harsh 
sentences and do more to prevent terror than incapacitation. 
There is no question that ISIS’s power is dwindling.424  Many say the 
caliphate is dead.425  But, alternatives to incarceration for those charged with 
material support remain important.  Extremist groups are not going 
anywhere.  In fact, the Trump Administration recently declared MS-13 an 
FTO, and would like to declare Antifa one, thereby expanding FTOs to 
include unorthodox, previously-unthinkable organizations.426  With DOJ’s 
latest decision to charge alleged MS-13 members with material support and 
President Trump’s promise to “designate [A]ntifa a terrorist 
organization,”427 the need for material support diversion programs endures. 
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